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GERMAN AIR LAW - A CASE HISTORY*
By FRITZ G. LORENZ t
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t ED. NOTE-The author studied law at the Universities of Lausanne(Switzerland), Heidelberg and Breslau (Germany), receiving the degree of
Doctor Juris, magna cum laude, from Breslau in 1912. From 1919 to 1924
Dr. Lorenz served in the Prussian Ministry of Justice, and for the next fourteen
years as Judge of the District Court and Court of Appeals in Berlin, part of
the time as Presiding Judge of the District Court. During the period from 1922
on Dr. Lorenz conducted seminars for young lawyers, wrote and published
several legal treatises, including a Handbook on German Civil Procedure, and
for many years he has been a contributor to Professor Schlegelberger's (Berlin)
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law and Professor Galganos' (Rome) Yearbook
of Comparative Law. Air law has been included in these studies. The JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE is honored to have such an able contributor to
a field and on a subject in which the English language documents are so limited.
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R.G.BI. Reichsgesetzblatt (German Law Gazette, since 1923 Parts I
and II.)
RGSt. : Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen (Decisions
of the Supreme Court in Penal Cases.)
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RT. Drucks. : Reichstagsdrucksachen. (Publication of the debates of the Reich-
stag.)
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CHAPTER III: LIABILITY
A. Regulations of the Air Traffic Act.
The draft of an Air Traffic Act proposed in 1914 provided rules
of liability for the operator (holder) of aircraft similar to those of
the Automobile Act, since it was the current opinion that the
general principle of no liability without fault, then applicable to
aviation cases, 28 4 did not afford sufficient protection for the public.
Under the regulations of the draft the operator (holder) was liable
for damages caused by operation of aircraft. The liability was ex-
cluded if the accident was caused neither by negligence of the
holder and/or its employees nor by a defect of material or failure
of machinery. The liability of the operator and pilot of aircraft
has been extended by the Air Traffic Act that regardless of fault
and acts of God, as provided by § 19:
(1) "If in the operation of aircraft a person by accident
either is killed, or his body or health injured, or damage caused
to a thing, the holder of the aircraft is obligated to compensate
for such injury or damage."
(2) "If another uses the aircraft without the knowledge and
consent of the holder of the conveyance the other is obligated to
compensate for the injury or damage in place of the holder. The
holder in that case is also liable if the use of the aircraft was made
possible through his fault. ' '2 5
The following §§ 20-26 establish regulations in respect to tak-
ing into consideration contributory negligence (§ 20), the extent of
the damages to be compensated (§§ 21, 22, 24), the maximum of
responsibility (§ 23), prescription, and exclusion of claims (§§ 25,
26). There are no other rules in reference to liability for damages
caused by air traffic than the above mentioned, 286 but said rules
do not preclude an even greater liability that may be based upon
other provisions of German Codes and Acts. Such liability, how-
ever, is always based upon malice or negligence regardless of
whether the case rests upon the law of torts or of contracts. As
mentioned above the German Courts had developed the principle
that the owner, who has to resign his right to prohibit interference
with his property, is entitled to damages without proof of malice
234. As for the exceptional claim for damages without fault at this time
see note 17, 18 if.
235. Translation by Carl G. Grossmann 1928 Air Law Review 148.
236. The Rome Convention of May 29, 1933, for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface
provides that the damage caused by an aircrat -to persons or property on the
surface shall give a right to compensation by the mere fact that it is established
that the damage exists and that it was caused by the aircraft. (Art 2 I)(Transl. (1933) 4 JOURNAL OF AIR.LAW 567). Said Convention up to the
present has not come into effect. As it is pointed out by Schleicher-Reymann,
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or negligence. Before the Air Traffic Act came into effect the
Reichsgericht had held that this rule applied also to air traffic, insofar
as the owner had no power to prohibit flights over his land.23 7
When the Air Traffic Act came into force the legal position changed.
The Reichsgericht 238 explained:
"The principle, as developed by the decision of the Reichs-
gericht 100 R.G.Z. 69, cannot be applied to the affirmative provi-
sions of the Air Traffic Act. The compensation for the general
restriction of the land owner provided by § 1 Air Traffic Act 239
is only to be found in the severe liability prescribed by § 19. (See
also 156 R.G.Z. 305).240 This is all the more valid as, after said
decision had been given, a fundamental and complete change took
place regarding the conception of the nature of real property.2 41
Hence, if § 28 Air Traffic Act says that the rules and prescriptions
of the Reich, under which the operator (holder) 242 or the person
using the aircraft is bound to a greater extent for damages caused
in operating an air conveyance, are not affected, said rule refers prin-
cipally to the law of torts."
B. Elements of liability under § 19 Air Traffic Act.
The liability for the result provided by § 19 Air Traffic Act
as distinguished from the Automobile Act is due not only to third
persons but also to all persons carried by the aircraft no matter
if for pay or gratuitously, for employees, students and so on. 243
The provisions under which the liability established by § 19 Air
Traffic Act takes place are as follows:
1. Damage must be caused by air conveyance. The Air Traffic
defines air conveyances under § 1, par. II in connection with § 1
Air Traffic Ordinance. 244 There is no question that many doubts
may arise as to what extent said definition is suitable; however,
no decisions of the courts are reported.
2. The liability is confined to accidents. The definition of the
Recht der Luftfahrt, p. 112 It may be expected that at this time the rules of the
German Air Traffic Act regarding liability will be amended since from then the
liability will be different against third persons and all others such as airmen,
passengers and employees.
237. 100 R.G.Z. 69. See note 25.
238. Decision of July 4, 1938 V 17/38-158 R.G.E. 34-1938 Archiv f(lr Luft-
recht 290.
239. See note 61.
240. See note 60.
241. The Reichsgericht Is here referring to the doctrine of national-social-
ism which may be condensed in the sentence: common welfare precedes the
welfare of the individual.,
242. See notes 258 sq.
243. Generally liability Is restricted by special provisions: see 1 23 Air
Traffic Act. Regarding employees' restrictions under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. See note 278. sq.
244. Kites and models with more than 5 kg.(about 11 lb.) are under the
Act. For gliders see note 65.
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word "accident" gave many difficulties. Even though the liability for
damages is due to the fact of an accident under different regula-
lations, a definition is only to be found in the Reichs Beamten
Gesetz.2 45 Said Act defines an accident met by a civil servant on
duty as, "a sudden, local and at the moment determinable event
that occurs in exercising or in consequence of the service and is
based upon external influence, causing bodily harm." The jurisdiction
referring to other acts mentioning the word "accident" gave the fol-
lowing definition: "An accident is an event that is determinable at the
moment, that is in connection with operating a factory, an automobile,
a railway and so on, and, that causes harm to the affected person by a
sudden influence. ' 24 6 In reference to the Air Traffic Act the Amtsge-
richt Emden247 gave the following definition: "An accident is a sud-
den occurrence which gives damaging characteristics to an event
otherwise harmless and happening while the plane is being operated."
In one of the latest decisions the Reichsgericht 248 said: "The Court of
Appeal (Kammergericht) proceeds from the correct point of view
that an accident is the sudden influence of external facts upon per-
sons or things which results in damage."
In this decision the owner of a fox farm claimed damages,
urging that the aircraft of defendant were flying over his farm in
scheduled flights at low altitudes and with tremendous noise and
that the female foxes, frightened and excited by the view and the
noise, aborted their young prematurely or destroyed them. The
Reichsgericht continued: "Although the point of suddenness has
predominant reference to the coming into effect of the damages,
the decision of the Kammergericht does not cast doubts about
this point. The Kammergericht established from its findings that
the female foxes suddenly suffered a psychic fright that lead to the
abortion and destruction of the young. The immediate damage is
the fright and this fright resulted suddenly. There is no doubt
that also such a psychic influence may be considered an accident.
It may be that the female foxes did not abort and destroy the young
suddenly, but the damages resulted from the fright and therefore,
the Kammergericht was correct in taking them as a consequence
of the accident. Also a deterioration of the female foxes is a
245. Act regarding Civil Servants of January 26, 1937 (1937 R.G.BI.1, I 39).
246. See 21 R.G.Z. 27; 44 R.G.Z. 253; in the opinion of various writers it
was held that an accident was plainly a bodily injury or death happening in the
operation of a factory etc. See Eger, Reichshaftpflichtgesetz § 1 Note 10;(Liability Act) ; MUller, Kraftfahrgesetz § 7 I note B II; (Automobile Act)
iachinger, Die Ainderungen des Blirgerlichen Rechts durch das Luftverkehrs-
gesetz, p. 33.
247. Decision of March 10, 1926-4 C 1833/25-1927/28. Zeitschrift fur
das gesamte Luftrecht 55-Transl. (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 219 by
Professor Zollmann.
243. Decision of July 7, 1938-158 R.G.Z. 34.
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damage resulting from an accident. The damage is not one that
came into effect in the course of time, but it is a continued damage
resulting from fright." Defendant rested upon the argument that
there was no accident because the airplanes had been operated in a
normal flight without any incident. But the Court rejected this
interpretation. 249  "The Landgericht giving the first judgment 250
in the case had held that a psychic disorder could not be considered as
an accident, because there was no immediate and direct influence
upon the female foxes.
3. The Act provides that the accident resulted in operating
aircraft.251 Such regulation corresponds to the provisions of the
Liability Act 252 and the Automobile Act.258 The beginning and
the end of the operation of aircraft are not defined by the Act itself.
The Rome Convention of 1933 relating to Damages Caused by Air-
craft to Third Persons used the term "in flight". The draft provided
the words "in maneuvers or in flight". Since there were many objec-
tions as to the vagueness of "in maneuvers", by a compromise the
words were struck and "in flight" was defined by a fiction in Art. 2
III as follows: "The aircraft is considered as in flight from the be-
ginning of the operations of departure until the end of the operation
of arrival." The wording is not supposed to restrict the liability for
all risks in operating aircraft as it was expressed in the final
protocol of the Rome conference. In respect to the proviso for
operating aircraft in § 19 Air Traffic Act the Amtsgericht Emden254
held that an aircraft is operated until it is stopped and passengers
have had the possibility of leaving it. In the case at bar a passenger
of an aircraft was injured by striking upon an object in the cabin
when the plane was landing. The Court abstained from a discussion
whether an occurrence happening after the landing would be an
accident under the proviso of § 19 Air Traffic Act since, in this
case, the injured passenger had not had the opportunity of leaving
the plane.
4. Whether damages result from an accident occurring in
249. Reymann, a~notating the decision in 1938 Zeitschrift der Akademle
ftir Deutsches Recht 784 pointed out that It may be contrary to the sense of
the Air Traffic Act if the consequences of normal flight would also be considered
as an accident. Doubts were also expressed by Schleicher in 1938 Verkehrsrecht-
Iliche Abhandlungen und Entscheidungen 262. The Reichsgericht gave no reasons
for its rejection.
250. Decision of Oct. 12, 1936-240 0. 459/36-reported in French trans-
lation: 1936 R6vue G6n6rale de Droit A rien 608.
251. "Bei dem Betriebe".
252. The Reichshaftpfllchtgesetz of June 7, 1871, dealing with the liability
for mines, railroads, etc.
253. In writings in respect to § 19 Air Traffic Act the conclusions found
in decisions referring to said Acts is pondered out.
254. March 10, 1926.-A C 1633/25. 1927/28 Zeitschrift ftr das gesamte
Luftrecht 55. Translated by Prof. Zollmann (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
219.
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operating aircraft is a question of causation. 25 5 In the above-
mentioned decision regarding the fox farm2 56 the Reichsgericht sum-
marized the present position of jurisdiction as follows: "The
Reichsgericht has held that an adequate causal connection exists if
an act or a forbearance was capable of effecting the result, which
came to pass. But, there is no causal connection, if the act or the
forbearance was fitted to reach the effect only under circumstances,
that were especially peculiar, wholly unlikely and to be left out of
consideration under the regular and natural course of events. (See
133 R.G.Z. 126; 135 R.G.Z. 149; 141 R.G.Z. 169). In reference to
psychic influence, courts have denied adequate causal connection,
if damages took place resulting from an uncommon disposition of
the injured, although the occurrence was innocuous if judged by ob-
jective standards. (Reichsgericht in 1908 Juristische Wochen-
schrift p. 41, nr. 16.)" In applying said principles to damages in con-
nection with aircraft the Reichsgericht said that from the viewpoint
of an objective observer, in the light of the development of aviation
within the last years, the sight and noise of aircraft flying straight
at a high altitude must be regarded as innocuous for a normally dis-
posed human being as well as for a beast of normal disposition.
The Court stated that "if there was any other (viz. abnormal) reac-
tion upon the silver foxes it must be traced back to the fact that such
species are imported from climates without air traffic and, due to
the particular conditions of its rearing, it is extremely sensitive to
the sight and noise of aircraft. '2 5 7 Proceeding from this statement
the problem of the adequate causality was to be decided in the opin-
ion of the Reichsgericht as follows: "If the foxes were damaged
because they were extremely sensitive, due to air traffic innocuous
from an objective point of view, the causal relation between the
operation of aircraft and the resulting damages plays no part in
the legal decision, since it is outside of the regulation that the law
provides. In the case before the Court an adequate causality could
be traced only if the fright of the foxes resulted from the flight of
aircraft at a low altitude with tremendous noise impressing the dis-
255. In German civil law the theory of adequate causality is generally
acknowledged. It says that a causality in the legal sense exists only in reference
to such facts by which the effect may be expected as probable, regarding a rea-
sonable perception under the natural course of events. cf. the similar theory in
Salmond-Stalyvrass Law of Torts 137; Hadley v. Baxendale (1845) 9 Ex. 341.
256. 158 R.G.Z. 34.
257. The problem of fox farms and aviation is of great importance. In
Germany about 1500 fox farms are supposed to exist (in Norway, about 17000).
From the decision of the Reichsgericht it follows that a claim for damages may
be based only upon § 19 Air Traffic Act and that plaintiff would have to rest upon
the argument that the flight was executed at a low altitude and with tremendous
noise and that other beasts also would have been frightened. But for the usual
flight the owner of the farm will not be entitled to damages. As Schleicher in
1938 Verkehrsrechtliche Entscheidungen und Abhandlungen 262 explained, there
Is no probability under the rules of Ministry of Aviation that such farm land
may be declared a prohibited area, because such a prohibition would Interfere
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position of the foxes in a way which was suitable to result in an
injurious psychic influence upon beasts that are not particularly
sensitive."
5. The absolute liability stated by § 19 Air Traffic Act is im-
posed on the holder25 8 (operator) of aircraft. Thus the German
Air Traffic Act provides the same rule as the Rome Convention of
1933 relating to Liability for Terrestrial Damages. The German
system left to the Courts the definition of the "holder". In the
deliberations at Rome many doubts arose as to this definition, and
the French delegation suggested that the problem be left to each
jurisdiction. But, considering that under different systems the
owner is liable and further that neither under the American 259 nor
the English system the holder's liability was established, it was
decided to give a definition of the person who elsewhere is generally
called the holder, which reads as follows :260 "Any person who has
the right of disposal of and uses the aircraft on his own account
shall be termed "operator" of the aircraft."
The definition to be found in the Rome Convention coincides
almost completely with the result reached in German jurisprudence.
Here, the holder (Halter) was deemed liable under the Automobile
Act 261 and since the Act itself did not define the meaning of holder,
it was left to the Courts to give an exact definition, which later 26 2
was generally applied to the holder of aircraft. Pursuant to the
proviso established under the Automobile Act,26 3 the holder (Halter)
of an automobile and equally of aircraft is termed any person who
has control of it, that means anyone who uses it on his own account
and has such full disposal over it as said control requires. 26 4 From
with the needs of aviation. However, the Minister for Aviation recommended
by several decrees that pilots avoid heading for fox farms flying over farms at
low altitude. See decrees indicating the positions of the farms, e. g. 36/21.3.
1936 Nachrichten fUr Luftfahrer 367; 39/19.5 1939 Nachrichten fir Luftfahrer
447. The same problem arose in the case of Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. v. Boeing
Transp. Inc. 1932 USAvR. 164 and in Norway see 1937 Archly fuir Luftrecht 334.
258. Halter des Flugzeugs.
259. Cf. Wigmore, The Uniform State Law Draft, (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 362.
260. Art. 4, 2, (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 312.
261. § 7 Automobile Act. The word "Halter" occurs for the first time in
the German Civil Code § 833 stating the liability of the keeper of animals.
262. The Amtsgericht Hamburg (decision of November 21, 1930-XII. Z.
3696/30-1931 Archly ffr Luftrecht 77; translated by Professor Zollmann (1931)
2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 591) brought up the question whether the maritime
law may furnish an analogy for explanation of the holder (Halter) and referred
to the equipper (Ausruester) in § 510 German Code of Commerce. The equipper
(Ausruester) is a person who uses a ship which he does not own for the purpose
of gain by navigation either by maneuvering it himself or by putting it under
the control of a master. However, the Amtsgerlcht Hamburg finally following
the definition found for the Automobile Act did not draw conclusions from its
suggestion and the Courts did not enter into the idea.
263. Definitions for the Automobile Act see 87 R.G.Z. 137; 91 R.G.Z. 269
and 304; 93 R.G.Z. 233; 120 R.G.Z. 160; 127 R.G.Z. 174.
264. See Oberlandesgericht Hamm, July 3, 1934 - 9 U 378/32 - 1934
Archiv ftir Luftrecht 274; Kammergericht, July 9, 1936-9 U 1748/36-1937
Archiv fUr Luftrecht 322 - cf. Decision of Reichsversicherungsamt (in refer-
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this point of view the holder of an aircraft may be called an operator
in the sense of the Rome Convention of 1933. In some cases that
have dealt with airplanes the following principles have been. ex-
pressed by the courts:
a. If an airplane is placed at a person's disposal for tem-
porary use (chartered for an acrobatic flight and the necessary test
flights) such person cannot become operator in the sense of holder
because it was not the intent to establish a connection for a certain
length of time.28 5
b. The purchases of an airplane becomes the operator by de-
livery of the plane even if the contract provided for reservation of
ownership and ownership was not yet conveyed. 21 6
c. The status as operator will not be affected if the operator
delivers the plane to a plant for repairs. 26 7 The Kammergericht
held that such principle was to be established because the operator
as owner could dispose of the plane at any time, and might request
its return from the mechanic.
d. In the case of the Amtsgericht Hamburg 26 8 the Court found
that an airplane had been hired for advertisement and that the bailee
paid rent directly proportionate to the length of the flights and that
he, even in adverse weather conditions, had "to give directions when
the flight was to begin, when it was to end, and where it was to take
place." The Court denied that the bailee was the operator because
it was not used on his own account, and because the "decision about
the beginning and ending of a flight does not include any consider-
able right to direct. "The decisive thing is," as the Court continued,
ence to industrial accident insurance) Nov. 20, 1931-1 a 8788/30-1932 Archiv
fUr Luftrecht 250.
265. Landgericht Stuttgart May 6, 1931-6 0 6709/30-1932 Archly fUr
Luftrecht 100.
266. Oberlandesgericht Hamm note 264. The same principle had been
established by the Reichsgericht 87 R.G.Z. 139 for the purchase of an automobile.
267. Kammergericht note 264. The decision dealt with the following facts:
The operator and owner had sent his airplane to an airplane plant for repairing.
The plant, after the repair was finished, ordered one of its employees, the son
of plaintiff, to make a test flight, on the occasion of which plaintiff's son crashed.
The Court held the owner liable as operator. The decision is in conformity with
the principles stated for the capacity as operator when an automobile is to be
repaired. Cf. 79 R.G.Z. 314; 91 R.G.Z. 272; 91 R.G.Z. 303: 127 R.G.Z. 174 ; 150
R.G.Z. 134. Following the quoted Judgments the manager of a repair work shop
who drives an automobile for the purpose of repairing or testing it, does not
become the operator liable for damages under § 7 Automobile Act. However the
Relchsgericht explained in its decision 150 R.G.Z. 138 that a different Judgment
might take place if the repairer is allowed a certain independent disposal and
if he substantially shares the expenses. 'But as a rule, such exception will not
fit repairing plants since the cost of test flights generally will on the account
of the customer. Oppikofer in his annotation of the decision of the Kammer-
gericht (1937 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 326) disagreed with the developed principles.
He explained that there is a substantial difference between an aircraft and an
automobile and that the courts should pay regard to it in establishing as a
rule that the manager of a repair plant becomes operator for test flights. He
felt that such interpretation would correspond to ordinary usage and common
interests as far as to the particular position of air law. It seems that, up to
now, the German courts have not defined their attitude regarding Professor
Oppikofer's opinion.
268. Note 262.
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that "the technical conduct of the flight is entirely independent of
the will and directions of the renter." On the other hand the Land-
gericht in Halle26 9 held the renter of a balloon to be the operator
because he had the disposal of the balloon and was prepared to pay
the cost of an ascent. In that case defendant had rented the balloon
for an "aviation affair" in the course of which an automobile club
was supposed to arrange a balloon chase. The automobile club was
willing to make a contribution to defendant's costs. Since the de-
fendant was afraid to begin the ascent under bad weather condi-
tions the automobile club increased its contribution considerably in
order to induce the defendant to make the ascent. The question
arose whether the automobile club might had become the operator.
The Court held that such contribution did not affect the defendant's
position as operator, since the automobile club by contributing a cer-
tain sum to the expenses of the ascent, did not take over the complete
cost and that defendant retained full disposal as to the management
of the ascent, the piloting, and the control.
e. In another case, decided by the Oberlandesgericht Hamm, 270
the owner of an airplane had allowed his airplane to be taken by
an instructor for pilots who put his own name on the plane and
assumed the expenses. The Court held the instructor to be the
operator.27 1
6. Use of aircraft without the right of disposal.
§ 19 II Air Traffic Act provides that a person who uses air-
craft without the operator's knowledge or consent is liable for
damages in place of the operator. Besides, the operator continues
to be liable if the use of the aircraft was made possible by his negli-
gence.2 72 It seems that such unlawful use, which is rather common
in automobile cases, has no great importance for air traffic. In
connection with the identical provision of § 2 I1 Automobile Act,
the Reichsgericht 2 73 declared that the use of an automobile with
the knowledge and consent of the operator becomes unlawful if the
user deviates considerably from the prescribed route, unless under
269. Landgericht Halle, September 30, 1931-6 L. 208/31-1932 Archly f(Ir
Luftrecht 185.
270. Note 264.
271. In this case the Court denied that the owner was liable under § 831
German Civil Code providing that "a person who employs another to do any
work is bound to compensate for any damage which the other unlawfully causes
to a third party in the performance of his work." In the same direction the
Amtsgericht Hamburg (Note 262) held that the pilot was not in the service of
the hirer of the plane.
272. The Rome Convention of 1933 says' in Art. 5: "Any person who, with-
out having the right to dispose of the aircraft, makes use of it without the con-
sent of the operator shall be liable for the damage caused, and the operator who
has not taken the proper measures to avoid the unlawful use of his aircraft shall
be jointly liable with him, each of them being bound on the conditions and
within the limits of the present Convention."
273. 119 R.G.Z. 347.
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urgent circumstances. The same principle will apply to the use of an
airplane, but it seems that such decisions are not yet reported. 274 The
problem of whether an airplane is used without the consent of the
operator if the agent of the operator was not acting within the scope
of delegated authority, is a difficult one. In a case decided by the Land-
gericht Stuttgart 275 the facts were as follows: Defendant, a corpora-
tion in Berlin, maintained a branch at B6blingen near Stuttgart 270 for
the purpose of giving instructions in flying for private pilots. It had
appointed an independent manager with commercial power of agency
who had control over defendant's airplanes stationed at the airport at
B6blingen. The Court held that under such circumstances the defend-
ant exercised its position as operator of the aircraft in B6blingen by its
agent and branch manager; hence the decision whether an airplane
might have been used without the knowledge and the consent of the
operator depended on the knowledge and the consent of the branch
manager. In the case at bar defendant rested upon the contention
that the branch manager acted against his instructions in putting
an airplane at the disposal of the charterer for acrobatic flights. The
Court, in its opinion, said that it might affect the relations between
the head office and the branch manager if the latter overstepped
the instructions but that it would not have any influence upon the
fact that an airplane piloted by an employee of defendant was
used with the consent of defendant. Also the position of the char-
terer who chartered the plane by a contract with the branch man-
ager, which involves the latter's knowledge and consent, is not
affected or changed if the manager overstepped instructions, as
the Court pointed out. It follows consequently that also the use
of the charterer did not become unlawful. The Landgericht Stutt-
gart stated in its decision that it was not contrary to the intention
of the head office to rent an airplane for acrobatic flights, but
that it was opposed only to such renting in so far as the airplane's
insurance did not cover the intended acrobatic flight. It would
appear that the question, whether the use of an airplane may be un-
lawful if an agent of the operator in consenting to its use oversteps
its authority, is not yet solved. From the statement of the reported
decision it is not known whether the pilot or charterer had knowl-
edge of the agent's lack of authority or not. Koffka-Bodenstein-
Koffka 277 say that the consent of the branch manager is sufficient
if it is given within the scope of the ordinary business of the branch.
274. Use of airplane without consent of the owner Is to be punished under
the Ordinance against Unlawful Use of Motor Conveyance and Bicycles of
October 20, 1932-1932 I.G.B1. I 496.
275. Decision of May 6, 1931-6 0 6709/30-1932 Archly f(ir Luftrecht 100.
276. About 400 miles from Berlin.
277. Luftverkehrsrecht, p. 95, § 19 III 2b.
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On the other hand, as they point out, the use is unlawful if the
branch manager in consenting to the use oversteps his authority,
which may be wider than the internal relationship to the head
office. The unlawful use is made by himself and the position of
the charterer depends on his knowledge of the misuse of authority
by the branch manager. If he knew that the branch manager
had no authority to consent to the use, he was using the airplane
unlawfully. In this case both made an unlawful use of the plane
without the knowledge and consent of the operator. Further de-
cisions are not reported and it may be remarked that the prob-
lem has not yet been thoroughly discussed. The question may arise
as to the position of the third person if the branch manager acted
within the limits of a written power of agency without taking care
of an internal restriction and the third party knew or ought to
have known the facts.
C. Restriction and exclusion of liability towards employees
and students.
1. Employees of the operator and compulsory Workmen's
Accident Insurance.
Workmen's accident insurance (Gewerbeunfallversicherung) 2 7
is compulsory for the plants of aircraft manufacturers, air traffic
enterprises, air schools, and other enterprises that are operators of
aircraft. As § 898 Reichsversicherungsordnung provides, the em-
ployer is liable for damages caused by accidents to employed work-
men and employees only if a criminal court has stated that the em-
ployer has caused the accident maliciously. As far as such statement
is made he is bound to pay the difference between the amount of
the damage and the compensation that is to be paid under workmen's
accident insurance. An accident is covered by workmen's accident
insurance if the damaged person was employed under a labor con-
278. § 537 Workmen's Insurance Code (Reichsversicherungsordnung). The
problem of liability for damages is not affected by the question to what coopera-
tive association (Berufsgenossenschaft) they may belong; that is only a problem
of organization: see decision of the Reichsversicherungsamt Dec. 15, 1924 (1925
Entscheidungen und Mitteilungen des Reichsversicherungsamts, p. 242, nr. 8.)
The question of whether about 1200 volunteers assisting in the landing of Graf
Zeppelin in a German city were to be insured under the workmen's accident
Insurance provisions had been submitted to the Reichsversicherungsamt. In an
opinion (XXXI Entscheidungen und Mitteilungen des Reichsversicherungsamts
109) the Court pointed out that they were not to be insured because an aviation
.affair happening but once was not to be considered as an exhibition in the
meaning of § 537 I 4d Retchsversicherungsordnung. At that time persons
occupied in landing work were not protected by the workmen's accident insurance
except if they were employed in the airship enterprise or were insured under the
Reichsversicherungsordnung by other reasons. The Act of Dec. 15, 1933-1933
R.G.u1. I 1077 and the Air Protection Act of June 26, 1935 (Luftschutzgesetz)-
1935 R.G.B1 I 827-amended the Reichsversicherungsordnung. § 537 no. 5a
provides now that the workmen in enterprises under the jurisdiction of the
Minister of Aviation are insured. Professional training and similar technical
instruction that corresponds to enterprises liable for workmen's insurance
have to insure their students under the new regulation § .537 no. 13 Retchsver-
sicherungsordnung.
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tract or if he was in a similar relationship with his employer 279
and was injured in an accident while engaged in duties. The Reichs-
versicherungsamt had to decide whether the members of a sport
club which was an operator of aircraft are in a relationship similar
to a labor contract if they take active part in operating aircraft
by rendering assistance to take-offs voluntarily and temporarily. The
Reichsversicherungsamt 2 0 held that such assistance is given for com-
radeship and sportsmanship and does not establish labor relations.
The Court added in its opinion that it would not come to another
decision if the owner of the airplane, who put the plane at the club's
disposal, would also be deemed an operator. A member of the club
does not enter into a temporary labor relation to him by giving assist-
ance as a clubfellow and sportsman.
A similar position was taken by the Oberversicherungsamt
Dortmund. 28  A student pilot was injured at an airport turning the
propeller by hand for a sport flyer who had rented an airplane. The
Oberversicherungsamt held that the student was not under the com-
pulsory workmen's accident insurance in an employee relation to the
sport flyer 282 and in consequence thereof, that he was not entitled
to compensation under the Workmen's Insurance Code (Reichsver-
sicherungsordnung).
On the other hand, the Reichsversicherungsamt u 3 found a
soldier to be under the compulsory workmen's insurance who was
injured in an accident while assisting the landing crew, for a small
allowance, in the landing maneuvers of a Parseval airship. The
Court held that the accident occurred in the airship enterprise and
that the soldier was there in an employee's or an employee-like
relation.
The compulsory workmen's accident insurance generally covers
only accidents occurring within the boundaries of Germany. If
279. § 544 1Retchsversicherungsordnung. (Arbeits hnllches Verhiltnils.)
280. Decision Nov. 20, 1931-Ia 8788/308--1932 Archly fur Luftrecht 260.
281. Decision April 13, 1931-Unf 85/31-1932 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 100.
The Oberversicherungsamt has jurisdiction in workmen's accident and old age
insurance cases.
282. The case is of general interest since the cooperative association had
awarded an accident insurance compensation of 50 R.M. (about $21) monthly
and the student had appealed. The awarding of compensation involved thedecision that the damage was caused by an accident covered by the Workmen'sAccident Insurance. By such statement a claim for damages against the operator
of the airplane was excluded (§ 898 Reichsversicherungsordnung) since there
was no way that a penal court would have stated that the operator caused the
accident with malice. Doubts may be expressed whether the decision did not
contain a reformatio in pelus that would be unlawful. The principle that no
party may be put in a more unfavorable position by its own appeal is generally
recognized and applies also to the workmen's accident insurance procedure.
The Court did not discuss the problem. Tauber, in an article published in 1932Archly fUr Luftrecht 94, explained that there was no reformatlo In peius
by repealing the compensation decree since the purpose of said regulation was
to protect the party, and all the circumstances were to be taken into account
to decide whether the party was now in a less favorable position.
283. Decision of Jan. "12, 1916-XVIII Unfallpraxis 166.
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an aviation accident happens in a foreign country the question might
come up as to whether such accident would be covered. Decisions
are not reported, but the Reichsversicherungsamt gave its official
opinion.284 It pointed out that the cooperative association would have
to reimburse the amount paid for the insured because of an accident
in a foreign country if it were reasonable and if the amount would
have to be spent by the association itself. That opinion is based upon
the theory of radiation .(Ausstrahlungstheorie) that has been de-
veloped in the jurisdiction of the Reichsversicherungsamt. Under said
theory, regardless of the general territorial system, 285 transitory work
outside the German boundaries is considered as a radiation of the
enterprise in Germany, that is an accessory to the insured enterprise.
It may be remarked that the Reichsversicherungsamt applied this idea
only to employees employed in Germany and only to transitory radia-
tion with the exception of employees in railway stations on the bor-
ders. As Dersch 286 stated, it may be possible to deem the foreign part
of an airline in immediate connection with the German part as a ra-
diation of the latter, but he expresses considerable doubt as to whether
a foreign part without such connection could be comprehended by the
compulsory insurance under the radiation theory.
2. Restriction and exclusion of liability toward employees and
student pilots.
The German law system is based upon the principle of "freedom
of contract". The law leaves it to the parties to make their contracts
and agreements under provisos they will find suitable unless com-
pulsory regulations are opposed. Regarding a waiver of the opera-
tor's liability, the Air Traffic Act contains no special rules against
an agreed restriction..2 8 7 The "motives" for the draft said explicitly
that the Act did not affect the operator's right to restrict his liabil-
ity by agreement within the admissible boundaries, and the courts
have generally 288 adopted this opinion.
Whether a general principle of civil law is opposed to a restric-
tion of liability depends on the wording and meaning of the respec-
tive clauses. There are no cases reported dealing with a clause that
was held plainly void.
284. Opinion of September 2, 1929-1929 Entscheldungen und Mittellungen
des Relchsversicherungsamts 305--Cf. Dersch in 1937 Archly ffdr Luftrecht 311.
285. Workman's accident insurance is compulsory only for the enterprise
working in Germany.
286. Note 284.
287. See below the discussion In reference to passengers noting that unless
special rules following from the relation between employer and employee are
opposed, the principles may also be applied here.
288. There is only a decision of the Amtsgericht Emden of March 10, 1926
-1927/28 Zeltschrift ftir das gesamte Luftrecht 55, Transl. by Professor
Zollmann (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 219-from which It may follow that
the Court was of the opinion that the liability provided by the Air Traffic Act
should be compulsory. The case referred to the exclusion of liability by a passen-
ger for a circuit flight. Beside the fact that the decision was reversed on appeal
GERMAN AIR LAW-A CASE HISTORY
a. In a decision of the Reichsgericht of March 26, 1926289 a
master flyer had waived all damages for himself and his heirs in a
labor contract made on May 13, 1919, i. e. before the Air Traffic
Act came into effect. The employer had bound himself to take out
accident insurance for 10,000 Mark in behalf of the employee, and
in consideration thereof, the latter had waived all damages beyond
the insurance amount. On December 6, 1922, after the Air Traffic
Act came into effect, the flyer perished in an airplane crash. The
heirs sued the employer and operator of the airplane urging that
defendant was under obligation either to take out insurance at a
stable sum or to adapt the insured sum to the inflation.290  The
Oberlandesgericht, in its opinion, interpreted the obligation of the
employer to take out insurance in behalf of the employee for acci-
dents in flying and eventual death as follows: Under the provision
the employer had undertaken a responsibility to provide for the
needs of the employee's heirs. The Court pointed out that under the
Air Traffic Act, which indeed came into effect after the date of the
contract, the operator of aircraft was bound for damages resulting
from an accident in the course of operating the aircraft without
negligence, and further that already in 1919, when the contract was
made, in the court's practice a person damaged by aircraft was held
entitled to compensation without proof of negligence or malice. The
Reichsgericht disagreed. The Supreme Court stated that the courts
in their decisions had permitted compensation without proof of neg-
ligence or malice only for damages inflicted on property.29 ' Hence,
in the Court's opinion, the waiver by the victim could include at that
time only damages resulting from an accident which occurred by the
operator's negligence, and, since the enterprise was under compulsory
workmen's accident insurance, the importance of the waiver was less
because the employer and operator was only liable under the rule of
§ 898 Reichsversicherungsordnung. 292 The Reichsgericht reversed
for a new trial because the Court of Appeal had not thoroughly
examined the question whether the employer had negligently omitted
to take out sufficient insurance. In respect to the question as to
whether the waiver of the claim to damages might be valid, the
(see below notes 311, 315) it is not to be determined from the opinion of the
Amtsgericht as to what extent the liability regulation was regarded compulsory.
The decision mentioned legal and moral objections against a general exemption
clause, but admitted that exemptions might be valid in single cases. It is not
clear under what conditions the Court would acknowledge a single exemption
and its statement that the general exemption was against the purpose of the Act
and against public policy is not definitely conclusive. In our opinion, the Court
attributed to the Act an intention that at least has not been expressed in the
precise wording of the Act itself.
289. III 178/25-1927/28 Zeitschrift far das gesamte Luftrecht 218.
290. At the time of the contract 10,000 Mark were worth $1330, at the time
of the crash they were worth $2.30.
291. See notes 17 and 18.
292. See text after note 278.
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Reichsgericht discussed only the time when t.he contract was made.
The problem, if a waiver of the liability which was introduced by
§ 19 Air Traffic Act, was admitted by the law, was not dealt with
explicitly. It is obvious that the Reichsgericht did not have any doubt
as to this. In the contrary case the Reichsgericht would have had
to ex amine the question of whether a waiver that was held valid in
law for the time before the Air Traffic Act came into effect, had been
affected by the coming into force of said Act 298 or not. From the
decision of the Reichsgericht it may be concluded regarding the
waiving of liability against employees that the Supreme Court has
no objections in as much as the employee is covered by insurance.
b. aa. The Landgericht Stuttgart 29 4 discussed the admissibility
of a waiver by a mechanic. The facts were as follows: A pilot
proposed to climb from a flying plane "A" to a flying plane "B"
and the mechanic had to let down a ladder at a given moment
from plane "A". He was delegated by an airplane factory that was
in a friendly relation to the operator of plane "B". Both planes
crashed, with the loss of life of all flyers, and the widow of the
mechanic sued the operator of plane "B" for damages. From the
facts found by the Landgericht it is not quite clear whether the
deceased participated as an employee or not, but he clearly was not a
passenger. The Court discussed whether the late husband of plain-
tiff had waived the operator's liability and had no doubt that such
waiver would be lawful and might be done silently; however, in its
opinion no reasons were given. Since an express declaration of inten-
tion was lacking, the Court looked into the question of whether a
waiver was to be drawn from the circumstances. The Court held
that an implied agreement waiving the right to damages might be de-
duced if there were striking proof that the deceased obtained the
promise of an exceptionally high allowance and had insisted on his
cooperation. On the other hand, the Court explained that the fact
that he participated in deference to his employer could be urged
against the conclusion of an undeclared intention to waive damages.
As the Landgericht said, even if the deceased cooperated volun-
tarily a waiver could be assumed only in case other sustaining facts
were evident in favor of such conclusion. In this respect voluntary
assistance and a certain insistance to be called in to participate was
not sufficient for the Court to state a waiver and even under the most
favorable circumstances the arrangement for an exceptionally high
compensation could perhaps mean a waiver against the operator of
293. The validity of a passenger's waiver of the right to damages from § 19
Air Traffic Act is discussed thoroughly by the Reichsgericht in the decision of
May 19, 1927-117 R.G.Z. 102 see note 310 and text after note 313.
294. Decision of May 6, 1931-6 0 6709/30-1932 Archly ftlr Luftrecht 100.
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the plane "A". Those principles are in conformity with the develop-
ment of German jurisprudence generally regarding the problem of a
silent waiver of liability.295
bb. An agreement between an air school for gliding flight and
a student, under which the air school would be liable for damages
only to the extent of a liability insurance, that it had taken out, was
held valid by the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main.296 Appeal was
rejected by the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main. 297
Defendant, the Air School, in its petition set up that a restric-
tion of liability had been agreed upon. The Court of Appeal examin-
ing the facts held that the Air School and the student had arrived
at an agreement restricting the liability although the student had not
signed a form used generally by the defendant for the declaration
of each student. In this form it was said that defendant should be
liable for accidents only as to the amount of an accident insurance
that he had taken covering 1000 Reichsmark for each student, and
that the student waived all claims for damages against the
school in so far as it was not covered by the insurance. The Court
found that the student had received a note from the defendant in
which it was stated that accident insurance had been taken out for
the student who might insure himself for a higher sum. In addition,
as the Court stated, it was clearly announced by posters in the school-
rooms and on the bulletin board, (on the latter also by a copy of the
form sheet), that defendant requested the students to agree to the
restriction of liability. Since the student had not objected to this
requirement, the Court of Appeal, in its opinion, established that a
waiver in the wording of the above mentioned form was stipulated.
The result as to which an agreement was concluded seems to be
correct, although the reasoning does not support the statement that
the parties had agreed upon a waiving proviso in the wording of the
form sheet. The Court stated that the form was posted on the bulletin
board, but it seems that the fact that such posters existed and that
the students did not object would not be sufficient to form an agree-
ment. As has been established in numerous decisions, it would be
necessary to state either that the other party knew of the poster or
that it knew or ought to have known of the issuance of general
terms for contracts by the opposing party with such terms. 298
295. See note 330.
296. Decision of January 21, 1932-2 bO 275/31-1933 Archlv fiur Luft-
recht 91.
297. Decision of January 26, 1933-3 U 75/32-1933 Archly fOr Luftrecht
94. The Court in its opinion said that the restriction of liability between the
operator of aircraft and passenger by agreement is lawful and quoted the
decision of the Reichsgericht 117 R.G.Z. 102 (See note 310). It seems that the
Court did not hold that there would be any difference between liability towards
passengers and student pilots.
298. In so far the decision has no special importance in respect to aero-
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& Transfer of rights to damages to the insurer by rule of law.
(Workmen's Insurance Code).
a. A more interesting problem which the latter decisions 29 0
dealt with refers to the relation between the operator's liability as
amended by the above mentioned agreement and the rules of the
Workmen's Insurance Code (Reichsversicherungsordnung). The
student was-for reasons without connection to his pilot's training-
insured by a local public sick fund300 that was under the regulations
of the Reichsversicherungsordnung. § 1542 of said Act reads as
follows: "Insofar as persons insured under this Act or their de-
pendants are entitled to damages caused by illness, accident, disable-
ment or decease of the bread-winner, under regulations of other Acts,
the right to damages is transferred to the insurer inasmuch as he is
bound to compensate the person entitled to damages under this
Act." The local sick. fund had granted the statutory protection to
the- student who was injured in a glider crash. It relied on said rule
and sued the Air School for the amount of 1000 Reichsmark, i. e.
the sum to which the liability was restricted. The problem for the
Court was whether in respect to the agreement restricting the liabil-
ity the insured person was entitled to damages under regulations of
other acts in the meaning of § 1542 Workmen's Insurance Code. The
question as to the interpretation of § 1542 is not only confined to the
cases on aviation accidents, and the German Courts in their decisions
in other liability cases often had to deal with it.3° 1 The Landgericht
interpreted the agreement between defendant and student as follows:
"Even if the defendant in order to protect itself and to comply with
the requirement of § 29 Air Traffic Act to secure compensation of
claims under § 19, took out a liability insurance of 1000 RM for
each student and'even if the defendant restricted its liability to this
amount by agreements with the students, the title for damages that
a student injured by accident acquired, was based upon the law.
The intention of the defendant as well as of the student was to re-
nautical law, but it may be remarked that Professor Richter in his comment on
said decision cast another doubt. He pointed out that the defendant in drafting
a form for liability restriction to be signed might have prescribed this formality
for contract pursuant to § 125 German Civil Code and that without the signing
of the form a contract therefore was not concluded. But, considering the pur-
pose of the form sheet it seems more plausible that the defendant required that
the form was signed more for documentary proof and control than that the
desired stipulation was concluded with each student only by signing the waiver.
299. See notes 296, 297.
300. Allgemelne Ortskrankenkasse.
301. The problem in a wider sense corresponds to the questions arising
from the principle of compensatio lucri cum damno. Under this theory theGerman Courts held that advantages that from the viewpoint of the infliction
of damages were caused by the damaging occurrence were to be deducted from
the amount of the damages. (54 R.G.Z. 137; Reichsgericht in 1934 Juristsche
Wochenschrift 896). In conformity with the general opinion of German writers(see Staudinger, Kommentar zum B(irgerlichen Gesetzbuch, (German Civil Code)
§ 843 note 3b,) the Reichsgericht (64 R.G.Z. 350 ; 130 R.G.Z. 258 ; 136 R.G.Z. 83141 R.G.Z. 171) made the following differentiations: If an accident that entitled
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strict the liability stated in § 19 Air Traffic Act but not to exclude
the legal liability by substituting a liability based upon an agree-'
ment. An exclusion of the legal liability might be in question if an
injured student would have a direct claim against the insurance com-
pany. '3 0 2 Under such point of view the Landgericht held that the
claim of the student was transferred to the public sick fund. The
Court of Appeal in its opinion found the opposite interpretation.
The Court said: "It is not important whether the students did ob-
tain a direct claim against the insurance company. From the pur-
pose of the insurance and the wording of the declaration to be signed
pursuant to which the students waived every claim for damages
against the defendant and with respect to the circumstances, the
agreement is to be interpreted as follows: The aim of the defendant
was to be released from any risk and any liability and to waive the
legal title based upon § 19 Air Traffic Act at all events entirely.
Defendant, its representative, agents and servants wished obviously
to devote themselves entirely to the fostering of aviation. The man-
agement business and the fighting out of law suits was to be limited
as far as possible lest defendant be hampered in accomplishing its
purposes. Defendant was well aware of the risks of gliders and the
risk to be entangled in law suits for damages. Obviously, that risk
was to be excluded. In case of accident, defendant intended to refer
students to the insurance and to be free of any claim. The payment
of insurance premiums was only reasonable if there was no way
of claiming it twice (viz. for premiums and for damages under § 19).
It might be admitted that the wording of the form was not well
drawn up and considered in itself was doubtful. But from the ex-
pression 'a waiver of any liability' with regard to the purpose of the
proviso and to the understanding that the students were to be ex-
pected to show for the want of such settlement, it follows conclu-
sively that the legal liability was definitely excluded and not only
the Injured person to damages gave rise to other claims for compensation for
the injured immediately under the regulations of acts and statutes, such com-
pensation was to be put on account. The courts in their opinions instanced
here especially the compensation for civil servants and workmen under the com-
pulsory workmen's insurance. On the other hand, compensations that were based
upon contracts and for the coming into being of which the accident was only
one cause, were not deducted, as payments from private insurance, collections
of fellow-workers, etc. (see Reichsgericht 1935 Juristische Wochenschrift 3369).
Since the decision of December 10, 1908 (70 R.G.Z. 107) the Reichsgericht hadjudged the compensation from an insurance-that the employer had taken out
for his employees under the labor contract or conventionally-like a civil
servant's pension and denied that such title from Insurance was based upon
contract. The question might arise whether the same idea could be useful for
the decision of the reported case of Frankfurt. But the Reichsgericht had
expressed some doubt as to the bearing of its own practice in a decision of
November 17, 1930-130 R.G.Z. 258-and in the decision of January 10, 1935-
146 R.G.Z. 287-the Supreme Court changed its mind by pointing out that it
would be against the sense of insurance to allow the advantage of the insurance
to the injurer. See also note 304.
: 302. The statement of the Court of Appeal implied that defendant was
entitled to payments from the.liability insurance policy.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
restricted as to its amount, and further, that it was replaced by a
voluntary liability based upon an agreement and restricted to the
amount fixed by defendant on the basis of the collective insurance.
Said interpretation is also in conformity to the provisions in the
transportation contracts of most of the air transport enterprises
which all contain corresponding clauses."
Professor Richter in his comment on the decisions 3° 3 said that
to him the claim was based upon the Air Traffic Act itself since the
elements for the liability were the same as those provided by the
Act and there was only the restriction as to the amount, a restric-
tion that in principle was found also in the Air Traffic Act. Further-
more, he felt that also an agreement in respect to the liability for
damages was to be regarded as a title based upon the law in the
meaning -of § 1542 Reichsversicherungsordnung. The courts did
not follow. The Reichsgericht in its decision of January 10, 1935804
referred to the principle generally stated in the German practice and
pointed out that a claim from accident insurance is always and
only based upon contract and is to be differentiated from a title
foundedl directly upon a provision of an act or other statute itself.
In this case the question was discussed in reference to the com-
pensatio lucri cum damno as to the amount of damages, since the
damaged person had received payment from the insurance company
in the meantime. But there is no reason that the question as to
whether a claim is based upon contract or upon statute could be
answered differently in respect to the relation of the liability for an
aviation accident and the above rendered provision of § 1542 Reichs-
versicherungsordnung.
b. In fact, the Kammergericht in its decision of July 28,
1938,805 dealing with an aviation accident accepted the discrimina-
tion without further discussion. The case referred to an airplane
crash with the loss of lives of passenger and crew. The passenger
was insured in the compulsory Reichs Accident Insurance. 806 The
airplane, which was on a flight from Berlin to K6nigsberg with a
projected stop-over in the Free City of Danzig, crashed somewhere
in the province of Pommerania (Germany). The public accident
insurance which was liable for compensation sued the airline for the
amount of 25,000 RM that a private insurance company had paid
303. 1933 Archly f(ir Luftrecht 96.
304. 146 R.G.Z. 287, see note 301.
305. 9 U 1761/38-1938 Archly fir Luftrecht 295. See also notes 309, 340,
368.
306. Relchsunfallverslcherung. In respect to the problem as to the applica-
tion of § 1542 there is no difference in so far as to whether an employee or a
passenger was injured. But it is understood that the problem only arises If
the injured was under a compulsory public insurance to which the workmen's
insurance code (Reichsversicherungsordnung) applied.
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to defendant for the accident and that defendant was willing to pay
to the widow and the son of the deceased passenger to balance its
liability. In reference to the transportation contract the facts stated
by the Court in its opinion were the following: "All contracts of
carriage by defendant are subject to 'General Conditions of Carriage
of Passengers and Baggage' that also copy partly the wording in the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929. Art. 18,
§ 5 of the General Conditions reads as follows:
'Passengers and baggage are accepted for carriage only upon
condition that, except in so far as liability is expressly provided for
in these Conditions of Carriage, no liability whatsoever is accepted
by the carriers, or their employees, or parties or undertakings em-
ployed by them in connection with their obligations, or their author-
ized agents, and upon condition that (except in so far as liability is
expressly provided for in these Conditions) the passenger renounces
for himself and his representatives all claims for compensation for
damage in connection with the carriage, caused directly or indirectly
to passengers or their belongings, or to persons who, except for this
provision, might have been entitled to make a claim, and especially
in connection with surface transport at departure and destination,
whatever may be the legal grounds upon which any claim concern-
ing any such liability may be based.'
Art. 19 says: 'Within the limits prescribed by Article 18 carriers
are liable for damage sustained during the period of the carriage
as defined in Article 18 paragraphs 2 and 3; (a) in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger;' . . . '(3) Carriers are not liable if they prove that
they and their agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage, or that it was impossible for them to take such
measures. ..
Paragr. 2: (1) In the carriage of passengers the liability of
carriers for each passenger is limited to the sum of 125,000 francs
unless a larger sum has been agreed upon (20,000 RM).'
Article 21 provides: 'Only the party who produces the ticket
or baggage check as the case may be, or who in default to do so
establishes his right, is entitled to bring an action arising out of the
contract of carriage against the carrier.' "
Defendant had adhered to a contract that on January 1, 1935,
the Deutsche Lufthansa had made with the Allianz and St uttgarter
Verein Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft (Allianz) for a general
accident insurance for air passengers. According to that contract
the Allianz granted insurance protection to the passengers. Passen-
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gers of the insured airlines were insured in so far as they had paid
the fare specified in its tariff (that was done in the case at bar) or,
before setting out on the flight, had paid a dispatching fee fixed by
the airline. (§ 1 Insurance Terms.) The sum insured amounted to
25,000 RM in case of death. § 3 II Insurance Terms read as follows:
"The sum insured will be paid in case of death to those persons
who would be entitled to damages under the provisions of Art. 18-21.
The amount will be paid if an insured airline has acknowledged
that the payment will be accepted as a cover for the liability to the
airline passengers as fixed by the transportation conditions. The
insured airline may enforce the payment of the insured sum to those
persons who are the heirs at the time of the death in proportion to
their shares. It may ask for proof that there are no other per-
sons who might be entitled to damages under the transportation
conditions or that such persons have given their consent to the pay-
ment."
§ 3 of the contract of January 1, 1935, reads as follows:
"If a passenger does not accept the general air passengers' acci-
dent insurance as covering the personal liability of the insured air-
line resulting from the transportation conditions, because he intends
to claiir damages under the transportation conditions, the Allianz
is prepared to grant protection to the Lufthansa for its liability.
Said protection will be based upon the general and special conditions
for liability insurance. The protection will cover in the case of death
the sum of 25,000 RM." The conditions of the liability insurance
provided under § 2 that the insurance covered the liability of the air-.
line to passengers which the insured entrepreneur had to answer for
under the general conditions of carriage of passengers and baggage
and under eventual divergent agreements.
Plaintiff rested its case upon contention that the heirs of the
deceased passenger were entitled to damages under the law itself,
particularly under the provisions of (1) § 19 Air Traffic Act, (2)
§ 823 German Civil Code, (3) the Warsaw Convention, and (4) the
insurance contract, and that these claims were transferred to it by
§ 1542 Reichsversicherungsordnung. As to contentions (1) and (2),
the Court held that the liability stated by the mentioned provisions
was excluded.3 0 7 In so far there was no transfer of title to damages
pursuant to § 1542 Workmen's Insurance Code. In respect to point
(3), the Warsaw Convention, the Court stated that this was a case
of international transportation in the meaning of Art. 1 of the
307. The Reichsgericht (note 309a) confirmed the decision. For the con-
tents of the judgment as to the admissibility of exclusion of liability see
below note 329 and as to the legal significance of the conditions in respect to
the construction of liability exemption see note 340.
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Warsaw Convention, because there was a stop scheduled in Danzig
that was not under the sovereignity, suzerainity mandate, or author-
ity of Germany. In respect to the question of whether the title to.
damages under the Warsaw Convention is based upon contract or
upon law, the Court stated that the Warsaw Convention applies only
by virtue of a contract for international transportation3 0 8 and that
claims granted by the law from such contract are always based upon
contracts even if they are not enumerated in the contract. Therefore,
as the Court held, the claims have not been transferred under § 1542
Workmen's Insurance Code. The Court denied that a person carried
in international air transportation was entitled to damages against
the operator of the aircraft under the Warsaw Convention without
any reference to the transportation contract.30 9 Besides this, the
Court stated that a valid transportation contract was made.
The Reichsgericht confirmed the decision of the Kammerge-
richt.3° 9a In reference to the point in question the Supreme Court
declared: A claim for damages which rests upon § 19 Air Traffic
Act is based upon the law itself within the meaning of § 1542 Reichs-
versicherungsordnung, since § 19 entitles one to damages regardless
of whether or not A contract was agreed upon. The Warsaw Con-
vention, however, does'not apply without a contract for international
transportation.- Hence, a claim for damages as provided by the
Warsaw Convention must always be based upon the transportation
contract and such claim is not transferred to the public insurance
fund pursuant to § 1542 Reichsversicherungsordnung.
Regarding contention No. (4) plaintiff had urged that aviation
enterprises are bound to take out a liability insurance by the provision
of § 29 Air Traffic Act that the accident insurance was put in the
place of the liability insurance and that therefore a claim would be
based upon the law itself. The Kammergericht said in its opinion:
"The law prescribes only a liability insurance to be taken out by the
defendant. The contract for liability insurance itself is always a con-
tract and there could arise from it only contractual claims. Besides this
the injured person would not have a direct claim from the liability in-
surance against the insurer; he would be entitled only against the in-
jurer. The same was to be said in respect to the accident insurance.
Defendant was bound by the conditions of the Reichs Minister for
Aviation to take out accident insurance to protect its passengers if it
was not willing to make a liability insurance. Claims from accident in-
308. The Court in its opinion referred here to Art. 3 of the Warsaw Con-
vention and to its reasoning in respect to the construction of the restriction of
liability agreed upon as referred to note 340.
309. It seemed to the Court that this was the opinion of Niemeyer 1936
Juristische Wochenschrift 1429.
309a. July 5, 1939-VI 303/38-1939 Archly fUr Luftrecht 172.
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surance are always based upon contract (See 146 R.G.Z. 288).
Therefore, there was no way that claims from accident insurance-
after all they are not claims for damages-might have been trans-
ferred to plaintiff. Hence there was no need for an examination as
to whether the relicts were entitled directly to demand the insured
sum."
With regard to contention 4 the Reichsgericht pointed out that
plaintiff's claim was founded neither upon the accident nor upon the
liability insurance. The Court rejected the argument that a title
based upon the insurance contract was only a transformation of the
liability provided by § 19 Air Traffic Act. It said that the liability
insurance was required by § 29 Air Traffic Act, in the wording of
1921, in order to secure the payment for compensation but not to
substitute another title to damages for the liability provided by § 19;
the damaged passengers or his dependents having no direct title from
the insurance contract. The Reichsgericht concluded that the acci-
dent-insurance was prescribed by the authority as a preliminary
condition, if the authority was expected to consent to 'general trans-
portation conditions' wherein the airline excluded its liability. The
Court left no doubt that the accident insurance was neither a require-
ment for the operating of an airline nor the basis of the transporta-
tion contract. Hence, it deduced that the liability for damages based
upon § 19 Air Traffic Act was not transformed to an accident insur-
ance. By construing the 'General Conditions' the Reichsgericht found
that the liability under the terms of the contract was not affected by
the insurance: the damaged passenger had to choose whether he would
accept the sum insured or would prefer to claim compensation under
the proviso of the transportation contract. The Court held that
§ 1542 Reichsversicherungsordnung, providing for the transfer of
claims based upon the law itself, contained a specific rule which could
not be extended to claims founded otherwise. The Reichsgericht
agreed with the Kammergericht's statement that the plaintiff was
not entitled to any claim against the insurer, finding that under the
terms of the insurance contract, the accident insurance was to be
paid to those persons who were entitled to damages under the trans-
portation contract unless they accepted the accident insurance.
Finally the Supreme Court considered plaintiff's allegation that a
decision against him would be unreasonable or unfair. Answering in
the negative the Reichsgericht said that the principle set up by § 1542
Reichsversicherungsordnung left to chance whether or not the public
insurance fund was entitled to a reimbursement of the payments
which it must make to the injured. In addition the Reichsgericht
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emphasized the fact that the passenger and not the public insurance
fund had paid the insurance premium which was included in the
fare. Finally it was said that cases in which the injured passenger
might get a twofold compensation could hardly happen and thus
might be left out of the consideration.
D. Contract for carriage by air and liability to passengers.
The German airlines generally accepted passengers only upon con-
dition that the operators and air carriers liability was excluded or
restricted and that passengers renounced claims for damages except
in so far as a liability was expressly provided. The problems aris-
ing in this connection are the following.309 b
1. Is a restriction or exclusion of liability consistent with the
Air Traffic Act?
2. What other legal provisions are opposed to an agreed re-
striction or exclusion of liability?
3. What form is provided for such agreement?
4. What is the legal significance and effect of different clauses
restricting or excluding liability?
1. It is a generally recognized practice of the German Courts
that the provisions of the Air Traffic Act are not opposed to re-
strictions of liability by contract. The Reichsgericht in its decision
of May 19, 1927310 pointed out that the question as to whether and
to what extent in July, 1925, the operator of aircraft could exempt
himself and his pilot from liability toward the passenger and his
legal representatives through transportation conditions is not ex-
pressly regulated in the Air Traffic Act. For its interpretation, as
the Court said, the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (Liability Act), § 844 II
German Civil Code and the Automobile Act (KFG.) may be taken
in consideration as analogous.
"According to § 5 of the first statute the owner of a railroad
may not in advance through a contract exclude or limit liability
for the damages suffered by the dependants. In § 844 Abs. 2 BGB
such a prohibition is absent. Precedents indicate that such an exemp-
tion within the limits of the lines drawn by the law (§ 276 Abs. 2
BGB) and the judicial construction of § 138 BGB may be agreed
upon in advance. (R.G.Z. Bd. 65 S. 315.) The automobile law
did not have to confront this question because neither owner nor
chauffeur are according to § 8 No. 1 KFG responsible for injury
309b. The problems 1-3 are the same as to the liability for employees.
Compare supra chapter III C2. Explanations made at that point are also
significant here.
310. IV 847/26-117 R.G.Z. 102-1927/28 Zeitschrift filr das gesamte Luft-
recht 296. Translation by Professor Zoilmann in (1930) I JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 220 No. 3, 223 No. 4.
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to the passenger or his heirs. A similar provision was contemplated
according to § 16 of the first draft of the Air Traffic Act of January
31, 1914. (RT Drucks. 1912-14 No. 1338.) When the act was
passed this provision was omitted as suggested by the second draft
of July 8, 1921. The viewpoint that the passenger assumes the dan-
ger voluntarily was in this draft overruled on the ground, that a
liability for damages to a passenger who has been injured as against
the owner of the plane advances the development of flying which is
in the public interest. However, the annotation to §§ 15 and 16 adds
at the end that the right of the owner to limit his liability within the
permitted lines by special contract is not affected thereby. (RT
Drucks. 1920/21 No. 2504 S. 2474.)"
The same opinion is expressed by other courts, but they do
not give new or further reasonings. 31 '
2. Restriction or exclusion of liability in respect to general
provisions of civil law.
The exclusion of liability is restricted by § 276 II German Civil
Code, providing that the liability for one's own wilful default cannot
be excluded beforehand by mutual agreement, and as to that there
arose no doubts in the opinion of the courts.3 1 2 The Kammerge-
richt s1 3 stated that a waiver that was contained in the conditions
of a contract of carriage by air was not void, whenever it did not
mention the liability for wilful default. The Court said that the
meaning of the waiver was to exclude liability within the limits of
the law and that there was no need to say that the liability for wilful
default, that was not to be excluded, was not excluded. Further-
more, it is established by courts and writers that a contract provid-
ing the exclusion or restriction of liability must not be contra bonos
mores. Here, the practice referred to the principles laid down by the
Reichsgericht as to the misuse of a monopoly. Such principles were
developed in cases dealing with the restriction of liability through
general conditions for contracts that had been made for forwarding
311. Kammergericht (as Court of Appeal in the case quoted note 310
aupra) October 10, 1926-5 U 6294/26-1927/28 Zeitschrift fUr das gesamte
Luftrecht 220; Landgericht Berlin: June 14 1927- 17 0. 69/26-1927/28 Zeit-
schrift ffir das gesamte Luftrecht 298 ; Landgericht Berlin: February 5, 1929-
20 0. 280/27-1930 Juristische Wochenschrift 19908; Landgericht Aurich: July
28, 1938-S. 206/26-1927/28 Zeitschrift fitr das gesamte Luftrecht 222, trans-
lation by Professor Zollmann in (1930) I JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 220; Kam-
mergericht July 28, 1938-9 U 1761/38-1938 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 295-;
Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, Sept. 22, 1938-1938 Hrichstrichterliche Recht-
sprechung no. 1625;-Rechsgericht, March 11, 1939 - VI 244/38 - 1939
Archly ftlr Luftrecht 168-; Reichsgericht, July 5, 1939-VI 303/38-1939 Archly"
fur Luftrecht 172. The decision of the Amtsgericht Emden (note 288) was
reversed upon appeal.
312. See 117 R.G.Z. 102.-As to 'juristic persons' in the sense of the
German law. § 276 II is applicable to the acting of the board of directors and
other agents properly constituted by the statute, but not to the employees in
the limits of § 831 German Civil Code.
313. October 16, 1926-5 U 694/26-1927/28 Zeitschrift fflr das gesante
Luftrecht 220.: as to the wording of the waiver see the facts in the judgment of
the Relchsgericht quoted note 332.
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contracts by the General German Forwarder's Association and for
the contracts of some other trusts and syndicates of enterprises on
whose use the public is dependent, (e. g. plants for gas, water or
electric power supply). 314 As to the contract of carriage by air the
Reichsgericht in the quoted decision of May 19, 1927, summarized
the principles as follows: "It would be beyond reason if after the
full development of air navigation and in view of the general public
being dependent on the use of such navigation, to grant the air
companies the liberty to misuse their monopoly and the situation of
the public to force passengers to waive the protection which the Act
gives them". Since the contract in question was made in 1925, the
Court had to examine the situation of the German air traffic at that
time and continued: "Such a situation of the public did not exist in
1925. There was then very little flying. The operation of regular
scheduled passenger flights was just opened by the Aero Lloyd and the
Junkers Concern and still in the initial stage. Generally, traffic used
almost exclusively dverland and sea-routes. Therefore, it was not
contra bonos mores, if the young industry attempted to unload the
risk of aviation on the passengers by contract, particularly, since at
that time there was not sufficient experience as to the ventures that
air traffic would run." Corresponding opinions were expressed in
the judgments of other courts. The Landgericht Aurich in a deci-
sion of July 28, 1926, 315 said: "At the present'time the general public
is not so imperiously and exclusively dependent on the use of air-
ways 316 that such an exemption (viz. of liability) amounts to the
exploitation of an economic monopoly and as such is against public
policy." (i.e. contra bonos mores). It must be admitted that the
point of view is not to be disputed for the air traffic at the time of
the contract, i. e. 1925, but it seems that the Court did not take into
consideration that the accident happened in a circuit flight. Circuit
flights generally are intended for sightseeing or entertainment;
hence, it does not appear that the public should be dependent on the
use of airplanes for such purposes. 31 7 The Landgericht I Berlin s18
dealing with an accident that happened on September 7, 1925, on a
scheduled airline flight pointed out that the restriction of liability was
314. 62 R.G.Z. 264; 79 R.G.Z. 224; 81 R.G.Z. 316; 83 R.G.Z. 9 ; 99 R.G.Z.
107 ; 102 R.G.Z. 396; 103 R.G.Z. 82; 115 R.G.Z.. 253; 106 R.G.Z. 388; 128 R.G.Z.
92; 133 R.G.Z. 388; Reichsgericht in 1927 Juristische Wochenschrift 655, 1588.
See also 143 R.G.Z. 24, decision of Dec. 15, 1933, in which the Reichsgericht com-
prehended the different groups of facts that might violate bonos mores.
315 Note 311, quoted In the translation of Professor Zollman.
316. Same viewpoint in Kammergerlcht: October 16, 1926, notes 310, 311.
317. Sometimes circuit flights are used for the purpose of medical treat-
ment (whooping cough), but, it seems that such treatment is not so generally
acknowledged that the public would be dependent on this kind of remedy. The
Landgericht Aurich did not discuss that viewpoint.318. June 14, 1927-17 0. 69/26-1927/28 Zettschrift ftir das gesamte Luft-
recht 298.
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not contra bonos mores, since defendant had no monopoly for traffic.
The Court stated that everybody had the choice as to the means of
traffic he would prefer for transportation. If the plaintiff choose
the airplane, he did not make such choice under compulsion to which
he had to yield in consequence of a monopoly which was founded
on facts or on the law, as he had in using the railway for overland
trips or a forwarder for transportation of goods, but he made the
choice plainly aware of the venture that he took upon himself. With
a similar reasoning the Landgericht I Berlin 19 denied that there
existed a monopoly for airlines at the time of an accident, on June 1,
1927.
Since the former decisions denied that for the time in question,
in respect to the cases at bar a monopoly was existent, there was no
need to examine as to whether the conditions of the airlines con-
tained a misuse of the monopoly. Yet, the decision of June 14,
1927 (Landgericht Berlin) in support of the mentioned reasoning
denied also a misuse of a supposed monopoly and said that the re-
striction of liability was only of a small extent, and that only the
liability for acts of God had been waived, whereas the cases, in
which the Reichsgericht stated a misuse of monopoly, referred to an
exclusion of liability for the faults of the forwarder himself or
his directing agents. The German writers on air law agreed gen-
erally with the opinion of the courts as to denying a monopoly:
Schleicher, e. g., in his commentary published in 1933,320 stated that
the exclusion of liability would not be the utilization of a monopoly.
But the position of aviation enterprises has changed fundamentally
from the development of aeronautics in the last ten years. The same
author, in the edition of 1937321 explained that, at that time, the
problem as to whether the airlines held a monopoly should be decided
in the opposite sense than by the Reichsgericht in 1927. The Kam-
mergericht in a decision of July 28, 1928, dealing with an accident in
1935 divergently from the former practice pointed out :322 "The deci-
sion of the Reichsgericht (117 R.G.Z. 102) denied that the public
was dependent on the use of airlines in 1925 and held that a waiver
of a passenger could not be deemed as a misuse of a monopoly of the
airline and of a helpless situation of the public. But, in regard to
the tremendous development of aviation, especially since 1933,323 it
319. February 5, 1929-20 0. 286/27-1930 Juristtsche Wochenschrift
19908.
320. Luftverkehrsoesetz ed. 1933, p. 105 note 10b to § 19.
321. Schleicher-Reymann, Recht der Luftfahrt ed. 1937, p. 125 note 1Oc
to § 19; id. Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka, Luftverkehrsrecht ed. 1937, p. 99 note
IV 2 a.
322. See notes 305, 340. The Relclisgericht upheld the decision: see note
309a.
323. In the beginning of 1933 the National Socialistic Government came
Into power.
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will have to be admitted that, already in 1935, a monopoly existed in
regard to the air traffic for the Deutsche Lufthansa, in as much as
scheduled air traffic had been used in the year 1926 by 37,600 persons,
in the year 1935 by 175,000 persons. Besides, the speed was increased
considerably by modern machines and therefore the use of airplanes
has become indispensable for urgent cases."
Since the Kammergericht found that the airline had virtually a
monopoly, it had to examine whether said monopoly was misused
or not. The Court denied any misuse and, in its reasoning, gave four
arguments: (a) The contract of carriage excluded only the liability
for damages as provided by the Air Traffic Act and §§ 823 sq.
German Civil Code ;324 but on the other hand there was still a liability
established by contract and such liability was considerably strength-
ened by an accident insurance. (b) Under the provisions of the con-
tract the liability was equivalent to that in the Warsaw Convention.
The Warsaw Convention had become a German Statute3 25 and it
would be inconceivable that the same restriction of liability admitted
by one German statute should be prohibited by another. (c) The
General Conditions 326 of the carriage contract had been approved
by the Ministry of Aviation. (d) The requirements for airlines
rated by the Ministry of Aviation later under August 21, 1936, pro-
vided that the enterpreneur might exclude the liability by agreement
with the passenger but that he had to take out an accident insurance
for such passengers.
The Reichsgericht in confirming the decision agreed with the
Kammergericht's opinion that a monopoly for air traffic existed. In
respect to the contention that the limitation of liability was a misuse
of the monopoly. it pointed out: "If a monopoly was misused in
order to dictate unreasonable sacrifices to the community, and,
especially in order to enforce a waiver of a protection that was pro-
vided by the law, such procedure is regarded in German practice
as contravening public policy (i. e. contra. bonos mores) (See 99
R.G.Z. 107; 103 R.G.Z. 82; 106 R.G.Z. 386; 115 R.G.Z. 218; 117
R.G.Z. 102). In such a case the relative terms of a contract are void.
On principle, it is held to be a misuse of a monopoly only, if the
proceeding which are alleged to be selfish, took place in regard to a
partner in contract and if the latter as a member of the public was
forced to make unreasonable sacrifices. The case at bar, however,
is not of this kind. As it was established by the Kammergericht, in
324. As to the reasoning for this construction see text to note 340.
325. The Warsaw Convention was published in the Reichsgesetzblatt by
Decree of Nov. 30, 1933 (1933 RGB1. II 1039) and on Dec. 15, 1933 an Act
to Put in Effect the Warsaw Convention has been issued (1933 RGB1. I 1079).
326. See text after note 306.
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lieu of the liability provided by the Air Traffic Act, the liability based
upon the transportation contract was maintained and was reinforced
by the insurance protection." The Reichsgericht added that the re-
striction of liability might also be against public policy if the passen-
ger and the airline as contracting parties intended to prevent the
transfer of the rights to the plaintiff by agreeing upon a limitation
of liability. However, here there was no basis for such a construction.
3. Form for waiver.
Neither the Air Traffic Act nor the German Civil Code prescribe
any particular form for the exclusion of the liability for damages.
That the declaration of a renouncement is supposed to prove clearly
the intention of the declarer to renounce it, is an understood and gen-
erally established rule. The Reichsgericht in its decision of May 19,
1927327 called special attention to this rule. Since there is no form
prescribed, a waiver may also be made tacitly. The Landgericht
Halle8 28 discussed the problem as to whether a passenger of a bal-
loon had tacitly waived the operators liability. Plaintiff, a member
of a club belonging to the German Aviators Association (Deutscher
Luftfahrer Verband), participated in a balloon ascent free of charge.
Under the rules of the association every pilot of a balloon was bound
to require that every rider renounce the liability for damages of the
operator before taking off. The operator had asked another rider to
waive the liability in the presence of the plaintiff without the latter
making any declaration. Plaintiff urged that, in respect to the weather
conditions, he would not have participated in the flight, if he would
have had to waive claims for damages, and furthermore that there
was no need for such waiver since probably his damages in view of
his being a club member were covered by insurance. The Landgericht
in its opinion stated that plaintiff was familiar with the proviso
established by the German Aviator's Association requiring a waiver
before the starting on a flight and that, in 1923, he had waived the
operator's liability in two cases when he participated in balloon
ascents, and that he personally heard when his co-rider waived liabil-
ity. But in the feeling of the Court those facts were not held to be
sufficient in order to infer therefrom that plaintiff had renounced
tacitly.329 In the case at bar the defendant had stressed the fact that
327. See notes 310, 332.
328. Sept. 30, 1931-1932 Archly fUr Luftrecht 185-see also judgment
of the Landgericht Stuttgart as quoted note 294.
329. Certain enterprises like theaters, concert-halls, etc., are used to
restricting their liability for checked clothing by posters. The courts held
formerly that such a poster did not have any effect at all unless the customer
had read it. But the Reichsgericht in the decision of May 14, 1926 (113 R.G.Z.
425) changed the former practice. It found that such posters were in accordance
with general rules of intercourse and of which customers must be aware. As to the
application of these principles in other legal problems the Reichsgericht, in its
decision of Nov. 22, 1934, (145 R.G.Z. 390) dealing with a poster in a private
car: 'You ride on your own risk', stated that they must not be transferred with-
GERMAN AIR LAW-A CASE HISTORY
plaintiff was allowed to participate gratuitously. The Landgericht
pointing out that the principles developed in the jurisdiction of the
Courts were not to be applied forthwith, said: "If it is established in
the Courts' practice as a rule, that in respect to riders of motorcars
and horse carriages, to whom a gratuitous ride is given it might be
agreed tacitly that, under a standard of fairness, everyone stands his
own damages (65 R.G.Z. 313), in other words, that each rider is con-
sidered to have tacitly waived all claims for damages 330 there will
be no doubt that this rule is in accordance with the general senti-
ment of law as to such daily occurrences. Another judgment has to
take place in air traffic. A flight is not yet-like a ride in an autocar
-a daily occurrence. 331 The risk of a flight, particularly in stormy
weather, is beyond comparison greater than that of a drive over
land. The liability which is established by the Automobile Act is
also different from the liability under the Air Traffic Act. Under
the latter statute the operator is liable for damages caused by operat-
ing aircraft, unless there is some fault of the injured person himself.
The Automobile Act, on principle, provides the same. But the liability
under this act is excluded if the injured was carried by the auto-
mobile or if the accident was caused by an inevitable occurrence."
out further ado to transportation cases. But it may be called into question as to
whether the idea that a person has to be prepared for the intention of the other
party to exclude or restrict liability was not significant in the case before the
Landgericht Halle. It may be noticed that plaintiff knew the requirement of
the Association as to a waiver, that he was aware of the pilot's intention to
comply with the requirement since the co-rider was asked for a waiver and that
plaintiff himself had waived the liability two times before, when he participated
in similar balloon ascents. See also note 330. On the other hand the Civil
Landesgericht in Prag (1928 Zeitschrtft fir das gesamte Luftrecht 56) denied
that an agreement restricting liability was concluded upon plaintiffs contention
that he did not understand the language (Czech) in which the proviso was
printed and that he did not take cognizance of the meaning of the words.
330. The practice is not uniform and also the German Jurists disagree as to
the requirements under which the exemption of liability may be inferred. The
decision 65 R.G.Z. 17 held that the permission to board a conveyance for a lift
was a mere actual event without legal significance. A similar idea was expressed
in 141 R.G.Z. 262 by explaining that in such case no contract for carriage was
concluded and that there was no liability from a contract. For further decisions
in this sense see .ommentar der Reichagerichtsrdte zum Biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buch note 4b before § 823. In 145 R.G.Z. 190 the Reichsgericht restricted the
significance of former judgments, that therein no general principle was laid
down, but, that the question whether a contract was concluded or not had to be
examined in every case in due consideration of the facts.
As to the extent of a restriction of liability, in other words, whether negli-
gence might be waived by a restriction of liability, the Reichsgericht (128 R.G.Z.
229; 145 R.G.Z. 390) said that it might be In favour of such interpretation if
the ride was given without consideration. But there are many decisions stating
that the driver is only liable for gross negligence (grobe Fahrlasstgkeit.: 128
R.G.Z. 229; 141 R.G.Z. 262; 145 R.G.Z. 394; RG. in 1928 Juristische Wochen-
schrift 2025). As to the poster mentioned note 329 the Reichsgericht said that
such poster must not be considered as a declaration of intention to any rider,
but that the driver or operator had to refer the rider expressly to such poster
before boarding the car, since there was a greater risk than in the cases of a
check room. Differentiating from the possibility of a tacit contract the Reichs-
gericht discussed, in such cases, also the question of acting on one's own risk.
The theoretical foundation of this problem is various. (see Enneccerus-Lehmann,
Lehrbuch des biirgerlichen Rechts vol. II, § 16 I 1, § 243 V; 141 R.G.Z. 262
with further quotations). The Reichsgericht I. c. held that it might be concluded
from an acting on one's own risk that the acting person consented previously
to an injury that might possibly happen later. Authors like Oertmann,
Kommentar zum Birgerlichen Gesetzbuch, note 2 to § 254, note 7d to § 823,
notes 5a, 5b to § 833 ; Krilckmann in 1932 Juristische Wochenschrift 3688 refer
to the principle of contributory default.
331. The accident happened in 1930.
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The Landgericht explained with regard to this difference that it
would be fair to deem a tacit renouncement in automobile cases,
because the rider has no claim for damages under the Automobile
Act, but that it would not be fair at all in aviation cases, since a
waiver would cover also casual events and acts of God. The Court
held that for reasons of fairness an intention to renounce must not
be attributed to a person only because he is transported in a gratui-
tous ride, if this renunciation would have such far reaching conse-
quences. The Court inferred from the rule issued by the German
Association for Aviation, which required that a waiver be expressly
declared, that practically the intention to renounce was not to be
attributed to transported persons for the mere fact that they did not
pay.
4. Legal significance and effect of transportation conditions.
German Courts had to deal with the interpretation of General
Conditions of Carriage Contracts only in a few cases and decisions
as reported refer only to the carriage of persons.
AA. Passengers.
a. Conditions before the Warsaw Convention.
aa. In the case before the Reichsgericht,3 2 the following provi-
sions were found in the contract:
"Participation in flight and the transportation of baggage is
at the exclusive risk of the passenger and his legal representatives
as against the airline company, its employees and ticket selling agents.
The passenger by accepting air transportation waives for him-
self and his legal representatives all claims for any damage or injury
occurring mediately or immediately to himself, his personal effects
and his baggage during or in connection with a flight.
A claim for damages in consequence of being excluded from a
flight in consequence of delay in, or interruption of a flight is particu-
larly excluded. There is no claim for a repayment of the price
charged if the passenger does not arrive at the airport or does not
arrive in time." The first and third paragraph were printed on the
rear side, the second on the front side of the ticket. The ticket was
signed by the passenger. At bar the plaintiff urged that the condi-
tions were not clear enough to have any effect at all, and in addition
only the exclusion of liability under the Air Traffic Act was meant
by agreeing to the conditions. The Kammergericht, as the Court
of Appeal 38 had pointed out: "From the wording of the contract
there is no doubt that the airline and its employees were supposed
to be free of any liability which could lawfully be waived. There-
332. 117 R.G.Z. 102, see note 310. Translation of Professor Zollmann.
333. Oct. 16, 1926-1927 Zeitschrlft fur das gesamte Luftrecht 220.
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fore, in deference to the law that admits an exclusion of any liabil-
ity (viz. except for wilful default) the waiver must not be inter-
preted from the intention of the party in a restricted sense. If it was
agreed that the flight was to be performed at the 'exclusive risk' of
the passenger, the. latter released the other party and its employees
from all liability that could be excluded by agreement. If, on prin-
ciple, it may be conceivable to renounce liability for endangering but
not for negligence, in the present case, such separation is not ad-
missible in view of the unambiguous contents of the contract of
carriage. As to the question of negligence, there is no difference
whether it was gross negligence or only slight negligence. If the law
provides solely that liability for wilful default must not be excluded
(§ 276 German Civil Code), such regulation involves that liability
for any degree of negligence may be waived. There is no clue to a
statement that parties were willing to differentiate" (viz. in respect
to the degree of negligence).
The Reichsgericht, 3 4 on appeal, gave a more restricted interpre-
tation. As to the liability under § 19 Air Traffic Act the Reichsgericht
explained that liability was waived accepting the conditions of the
transportation contract as printed on the reverse of the ticket either
by the purchase of the ticket or at least by its signing. Defendant,
in his petition: established that the exclusion of liability covered not
only mishaps which were due to the inherent dangers connected with
a regular and careful flight, but also such misfortune as resulted
from unambiguous and clear faults of operator or pilot. The
Reichsgericht did not agree with this interpretation and said: "In so
far as the conditions impute to the passenger a waiver of legal
damages, the interpretation cannot be extensive and the requirement
of clear expression has to be taken into particular consideration.
Besides, only the declared intention is to be considered for interpreta-
tion and the airline, which had formulated the conditions by itself,
must approve of an interpretation such as the passenger would con-
ceive of it in good faith and with due regard to ordinary usage. The
wording alone is all the less conclusive, since, in the present case, it
may be construed in many ways." In reference to the general knowl-
edge and the estimate of the special dangers of air traffic in 1925, the
Court explained that a passenger would have considered these dan-
gers, if he learned that he was to abide the risk and thus to waive the
liability stated by the law, but that the idea he was supposed to waive
also the fault of operator and pilot and even gross negligence was
more foreign to his thinking, and hence, that with respect to good
334. See note 332.
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faith and ordinary usage he could presume that such imputation
would be shown clearly and in a wording not to be misconstrued.
The Court, stating that this was not done, continued :335
"The transportation conditions as printed on the rear of the
ticket merely say that participation in flight is at the exclusive risk of
the passenger but do not say that he waives all liability of owner or
pilot for their own fault within the meaning of §§ 825, 831, 276 Abs.
1 BGB. The second paragraph of the general transportation condi-
tions as reported in the statement of facts which uses the word "pre-
caution" is not reprinted. There is no finding that the passenger
knew about this paragraph or that the construction of it by the de-
fendant was in any manner brought to his notice when he bought his
ticket or signed it or that the complete transportation conditions were
posted in the ticket office or pointed out to him. There was no par-
ticular reason why he should inquire about them because the general
conditions were reprinted on the rear of the ticket and he was entitled
to assume that such reprint was correct and essentially exhaustive."
Another construction could have taken place, as it follows from
the Court's reasoning, if the passenger had known that the airline
gave the contended sense to the conditions. Also the third para-
graph, as the Reichsgtricht stated, did not support the defendant,
since it dealt essentially with damages for exclusion from and delay
or interruption of flight, but not with damages resulting from fault
of operator or pilot in reference to equipment or in selecting, instruct-
ing or supervising the pilot or in reference to duly fighting the
particular dangers of aviation. The Court said furthermore:
"It was not necessary that the passenger should know that the
'employees' mentioned in the first paragraph-contrary to § 18 KFG
-were not within the meaning of the Air Traffic Act, liable. It could
not be expected that he would deeply ponder the meaning of this
paragraph dealing as it did with employees. On the other hand it
would have been easy for the company to express the meaning of the
condition which it now contends far more clearly by the use of a few
additional words."
bb. In a case before the Landgericht I Berlin 83 6 the conditions
printed on the ticket were the following: Paragraph 1 and 3 were
the same as in the case of the Reichsgericht, except that paragraph
3 was here paragraph 2 and in the Landgericht's case par. 3 read
as follows:
"As for the rest it is referred to the 'General Conditions for
385. Translation of Professor Zollmann, (1930) I JOURNAL AIR LAW 220.
336. June 14, 1927-1927/28 Zeitschrift fitr das gesamte Luftrecht 298.
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Transportation, for Passenger Air Traffic,' which are put up on air-
ports and in the agent's offices."
The Landgericht gave the following construction:
"The conditions contain a restriction of liability in so far as
participation in flight is at the exclusive risk of passengers. From
this proviso it does not result that defendant had the intention of
being released from liability for fault of his own or of employees.
In the law field the term risk (Gefahr) is used generally in the
meaning of damages caused without fault or resulting from events
for which there is no responsibility."
The court found defendant liable under §§ 276, 278 German
Civil Code, examining the question whether there was any fault of
defendant and denied there was.33 7
cc. The same conditions obviously have been agreed upon for
a transportation contract in the case decided by the Landgericht I
Berlin on Feb. 5, 1929.338 No other principles are to be gathered
from the opinion in this decision.
dd. In the case which was dealt with in the decisions of the
Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe and of the Reichsgericht (judgments
of Sept. 22, 1938, and March 11, 1939)338a a passenger was killed in
a circular flight on May 1, 1934. The liability of operator and pilot
had been excluded by an agreement, the wording of which is not re-
ported. Both decisions held the exclusion of liability to be lawful.
It is not clear whether the passenger had participated gratuitously.
The Oberlandesgericht stated in reference to the exclusion of liability
that no differentiation was to be made between 'a transportation con-
tract for a fare and a gratuitous ride, but no particulars were given.
The Court construed the agreement by which the liability was re-
stricted without considering the question of whether or not the flight
was paid for. It held that only the liability based upon § 19 Air
Traffic Act was excluded but not liability for negligence. The Reichs-
gericht in its opinion stated that there was no reason to interpret
the exclusion of liability in a wider sense implying also exclusion of
the liability based upon § 831 German Civil. Code.3SSb Dr. Bdirmann
in annotating the decisions,338 c hints at the question whether a pro-
viso excluding liability should not be construed in a more extended
sense, if the flight was gratuitous.3ssd
b. J.A.T.A. conditions (after February 13, 1933).
337. See note 346.
338. 20 0. 286/27-1930 Juristische Wochenschrift 19903.
338a. See note 346a.
338b. See text after note 355a.
338c. 1939 Archly fUr Luftrecht 1-71.
338d. The problem was discussed in many decisions dealing with rides In
other conveyances; see note 330.
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The air line companies, among them the Deutsche Lufthansa
and the Deutsche Zeppelin Rheederei which were members of the
J.A.T.A., had agreed mutually on the introduction of uniform con-
ditions for air. transportation contracts as voted and amended in the
conferences of Antwerp and Budapest in 1930/1931839 and on
February 13, 1933, the conditions came into operation. They are
applicable to all carriage by the German airlines as named above.
The construction of said conditions gained in importance for the
judgments of the Kammergericht of July 28, 1938 and of the Reichs-
gericht of July 5, 1939. 3 40 The Kammergericht in its opinion inter-
preted the conditions that they exempted all claims based upon
§ 19 Air Traffic Act and §§ 823 of German Civil Code which
latter refer to torts or unlawful acts (unerlaubte Handlungen).
The Court in its full reasoning said as follows: "The exemp-
tion from liability that is agreed upon under Art. 18 § 5 refers to any
claim no matter upon whatever legal title they may be based, except
the liability which is assumed under Art. 19 § 1. That liability,
which conforms materially with the liability under the Warsaw Con-
vention, is merely a contractual one. It follows from contents, con-
nection and meaning of the "General Conditions of Carriage" and
from the Warsaw Convention as its basis, which is copied partly in
the wording. The "General Conditions" and the Warsaw Convention
are applicable to "international carriage" of persons and so on.
(Art. 1) As to whether "international carriage" is in question de-
pends on the contract made by the parties (Art. 1 (2), and Art. 1 (3)
refers expressly to a contract8 4' of carriage. Art. 3 of the Warsaw
Convention and Art. 2 of the Conditions deal with the passenger
tickets. Art. 3 of the Warsaw Convention and Art. 2, § 6 of the
Conditions provide that the absence, irregularity or loss of the ticket
does not affect the existence of the contract of carriage, which shall
none the less be subject to the Conditions. Also Art. 4 of the Warsaw
Convention, Art. 9 of the Conditions assume a contract in dealing
with the baggage check. Art. 13 of the Conditions provides the
"Conclusion of the Contract of Carriage," Art. 22 refers to actions
under the provisions of a contract of carriage. Under the Warsaw
Convention, and the General Conditions the air carrier is liable to
passengers, under § 19 Air Traffic Act, on the other hand, the
operator is liable if a person3 42 is injured. Art. 23 Warsaw Con-
339. English and French texts also in R~vue A~ronautique Internationale
No. 2 p. 281, German text for carriage of passengers and baggage in Schleicher-
Reymann, Recht der Luftfahrt p. 304.
340. See text after note 306, where the conditions of the transportation
contract are given in particular.
341. In the German Conditions: "Bef6rderungsvertrag". The English text
uses the word: 'Contract."
342. Viz. passengers, other carried persons, and third persons.
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vention provides: "Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of
liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this
convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such provision
shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain
subject to the provisions of this convention."
The connection of claims provided by the Warsaw Convention
with any other "action for damages, however founded," is ruled not
before Art. 24 Warsaw Convention, under which provision all more
extended claims for damages under other regulations and provisions
are excluded. The Warsaw Convention establishes in Art. 24 in its
paragraph 1 that, "(1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any
action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limits set out in this convention."
Consequently, Art. 18 § 5 in connection with § 19 of the
"General Conditions of Carriage of Passengers" must be interpreted
as to the effect that all claims, which are not founded upon the
contract of carriage were excluded."
Up to now, no other decisions dealing with the "General Condi-
tions of Carriage of Passengers and Baggage" are reported. The
case at bar referred to an international transportation; but since
the conditions are applicable not only to international but also to
internal carriage, the reasoning of the Kammergericht has to be
taken in consideration for any contract of carriage. It may be re-
marked that the provisions of the "General Conditions" which do
not apply to internal carriage pursuant to Art. 1 paragraph 2, were
of no account for the decision of the Court.
BB. Representatives of a killed passenger.
The conditions of carriage in the different cases decided by
German courts contained a proviso that the passenger renounce all
claims not only for himself but also for his representatives. The
binding effect of such waiver on the representatives is out of ques-
tion under the assumption that the passenger himself was bound.
The Reichsgericht established the rule343 that an indirect victim
is not entitled to damages, under § 844 German Civil Code, if the
deceased victim had waived any claim. The Kammergericht in the
decision of October 16, 1926, 4 4 adopted said principle. The widow
of a passenger killed in a crash had founded an action in her own
right upon § 21 11 Air Traffic Act, § 844 German Civil Code, with
the allegation that she had lost the right of maintenance. The Court
343. 65 R.G.Z. 315; 69 R.G.Z. 186. The decisions did not deal with aircraft
accidents but the principle applies also here. § 21 II Air Traffic Act corresponds
with § 844 II German Civil Code.
344. As did the court of appeal in the case quoted note 332. Decision of
the Kammergericht 5 U 6294/26-1927 Zeitschrift ffr die gesamte Luftsrecht-
wissenschaft 220.
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held that the plaintiff had no title to damages, which the deceased
would not have had if he had been the injured and entitled person.
As to a claim vested in plaintiff by inheritance, the court referred
to a decision of the Reichsgericht 45 that explained that a person
killed in a mishap could not be entitled to damages beyond his death.
E. Liability for fault under the conditions of contract of car-
riage.
In the case decided by the Landgericht Berlin 340 it resulted
from the interpretation of the contract of carriage that defendant
was liable for any damage caused by the fault of its own or of its
employees.. The plaintiff urged that the pilot acted negligently be-
cause weather conditions were such that the flight ought not to have
been executed and because, against general rules, the motor was
tested before the take-off not from 10 to 20 minutes, but for a few
minutes only. The Landgericht in its opinion stated that there was
no need to decide whether the pilot acted negligently in undertak-
ing the flight in spite of bad weather conditions, since the accident,
a breakage of the gasoline pipe, had no connection with the weather.
The Court remarked that the fact that other planes had been flown
as scheduled without accident argued against the assumption of neg-
ligence. In reference to the motor test the Court held that the pilot,
who had performed a flight from Dresden to Berlin in the same
plane the same day, could assume that the plane was in good trim.
From the fact that the pilot had flown the plane, the Court concluded
that he assumed a good condition with the reasoning that otherwise
he would have risked his own life too. In reference to the motor
test, the Court found that the test lasted only 5 minutes. Also here
the Court left undecided to what extent a pilot, not acting negligently,
had to make a motor test, since the plane had been flown the same
day for a longer time than 20 minutes, and it added that also a
test of 20 minutes would not have prevented the accident since the
crash happened after the motor was running in test 5 minutes and in
flight 20 minutes; in other words, after a total running time which
lasted longer than the test time alleged as necessary by the plaintiff.
A case dealing with the liability of a pilot who had motor
trouble was decided by the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe and the
345. 55 R.G.Z. 24.
346. Decision of June 14, 1927-see note 336. The case of the Relchsgerlcht(May 19, 1922-see note 311) involved after reversal for new trial, besides other
problems, the question of whether an essential fault on the part of the owner
or pilot of the aircraft was present, since the waiver was construed not to
exempt the liability for damages caused by fault. The Relchsgerlcht in its
opinion has not discussed the problem of fault because the facts were incomplete.
The problem of fault is also dealt with in some penal cases, see below Chapter
IV C.
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Reichsgericht.8 4 6a The widow and the children of a passenger killed
in an airplane crash sued pilot and operator for damages. In reference
to the problem of the pilot's liability under § 823 German Civil Code
the following findings of the Courts are of interest: The pilot flew a
single motored airplane at an altitude of nearly 650 feet when the
motor misfired. He tried to get the motor going and, in the mean-
time, he considered the possibilities for an emergency landing and
looked around for a suitable space on the ground. He failed to re-
vive the motor and, in attempting an emergency landing, crashed
thirty seconds after the motor had misfired. Under § 823 German
Civil Code a person who unlawfully and with malice or negligence
damages life, body, health, freedom, property or other rights of an-
other person is liable for damages. § 823 II provides that the same
rule applies if a person infringes a provision which is intended to pro-
tect other persons. The Oberlandesgericht held that the pilot had
used the necessary care; the Reichsgericht reversed the decision. It
held that the pilot acted negligently, because he ought to have taken
the necessary steps for an emergency landing immediately. He was
not allowed to lose any time in his efforts to start the motor. The
Court established that a careful pilot would have landed immediately,
since it is rather unusual that an airplane motor which misfired will
work again regularly after a few seconds. The Reichsgericht held
that it was of no significance in determining the amount of care nec-
essary, whether or not the pilot was out of practice and whether
or not he would have been equal to the task with more practice and
whether or not most pilots had met with no accident up to now be-
cause they had never encountered a situation with which they could
not cope. All these points might have importance in reference to
the penal responsibility, but did not affect - as the Reichsgericht
declared-the requirements which must be set up under the civil law
for the care to be used by a pilot. The pilot had pleaded that he had
not noticed the place best fitted for an emergency landing because
his view was obstructed by the right wing. The Reichsgericht in its
reasoning declared that the pilot was bound under the provision of
§ 78 Air Traffic Ordinance in the wording of 1930 (now § 78) to fly
over towns and other inhabited places at such an altitude that he
was able to land at the next airport or outside of the town in case of
an emergency. The Court continued: "Therefore, during the flight
over the town, the pilot had always to consider where he could find
a place suitable for an emergency landing and had to fly at such an
altitude that he was certain to reach the place if the motor misfired."
346a. Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe,-Sept 22, 1938-1938 HMchstrlchterltche
Rechtsprechung no. 1625; Reichsgericht,-March 11, 1939-VI 244/38-1939
Archly fUr Luftrecht 168.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Due care required, as the Court added, that he watch also for the.
atmospheric conditions and fly at a height that allowed a safe land-
ing under all circumstances. The Reichsgericht deduced from the
facts stated that the pilot acted negligently.
In addition the Supreme Court held that § 78 of the Air Traffic
Ordinance in the wording of 1930 (now § 70) is a provision intended
for the protection of other persons within the meaning of § 823 II
German Civil Code and stated that the pilot was liable for damages
also under § 823 1I. From the fact that the plane crashed in an
emergency landing the Reichsgericht concluded that the plane was
not flown at an altitude as prescribed by § 78 (§ 70), i. e. an altitude
which allows an emergency landing at the next airport or outside of
the town. It should be noted that the Reichsgericht did not discuss
the problem of causality and did not make any statement whether
the pilot would have been able to make a safe landing from a higher
altitude. Probably the opinion of the experts did not give rise to any
doubts in this respect.
F. Contributory fault of the injured.
§ 20 Air Traffic Act, except for a slight change in the wording,
copies § 9 of the Automobile Act. It establishes the rule that con-
tributory fault of the injured person or, if a thing is damaged, of
the person who had actual control, has to be taken into consideration
pursuant to § 254 German Civil Code. As to the decisions, in which
contributory fault is discussed, it has to be remarked that the courts
had to decide only the question of whether the injured person con-
tributed to the fault. General problems as to the theory of con-
tributory default did not appear in the cases as reported. The
Landgericht Stuttgart347 said in its decision of May 6, 1931, that it
was no contributory fault to participate in an acrobatic flight, that
was rated by the competent authority.8 48 As to the action of a bal-
loon rider, who was injured in the landing, the defendant had raised
the point of contributory fault. The Court3 49 referred to a decision
of the Reichsgericht and explained that even if, at the moment of
danger, plaintiff had taken an unsuitable position, such action would
not be considered a contributory default.
In regard to a test flight in a repaired airplane, defendant urged
contributory default of the crashed pilot because he had no para-
347. 1932 Archly fir Luftrecht 100-see note 294.
348. Since participation in a flight is no default as stated by the Reichs-
gericht 72 R.G.Z. 171, (see note 11) it is also not contributory default. The prob-
lem in question resulted from the fact that the flight was extremely dangerous,
because the pilot had proposed to climb from a flying plane onto another one,
but the court in its opinion abstained from any observation as to the particular
risk.
349. Landgericht Halle note 328. The decision of the Relchsgericht 1907
Juristische Wochenschrift 307 dealt with contributory fault in a non-aviation
case.
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chute. The Kammergericht in its decision of July 9, 1936,30 held
that it was not material whether the pilot refused to take a parachute
with him, since at the time of the crash, there was no rule providing
that the pilot in a test flight had to be equipped with a parachute.3 -5
The Court in its reasoning declared furthermore, that even if, as a
general rule, the test flyer had to be equipped with a parachute the
judgment would not be different. A wing was broken at an altitude
of 200 meter (about 6500 feet) and the Court said: "In deciding
the question of whether the pilot would not have been killed, if he
had been equipped with a parachute, different facts are in considera-
tion, that cannot be definitely ascertained, even by experts. It may
be problematic whether the pilot frightened by the loss of the wing
would not have missed the jump, whether he would have had the
opportunity to jump and if so, whether he would have had the oppor-
tunity to make a safe jump and landing." The Court inferred from
all those doubts that defendant could not furnish 'proof that the
pilot, equipped with a parachute, would not have been killed.
In reference to the action of a student pilot, who had crashed
during a lesson with a glider in a flying lesson, the Landgericht
Frankfurt am Main 52 declared that it was quite natural that the
student pilot, just as a student driver, makes mistakes, perhaps
incomprehensible to an expert, but that not every mistake could be
imputed as a fault on the part of a student and that otherwise the
liability stated in § 19 Air Traffic Act would be without significance.
On the other hand, the Oberlandesgericht Hamm853 applied
a more vigorous standard to the action of a student pilot, who was
nearly 20 years old, shortly before entering the pilot's examination
and familiar with the risks of flight. The student had turned the
propeller, though he was aware that the motor was hot and though
he was warned by a police officer. The Court held the student
guilty of such preponderant default that it confirmed the dismissal
of a suit for damages against the operator. The plaintiff had urged
that he was asked by the operator to turn the propeller; the Court
found that the operator had not acted negligently in asking plain-
tiff, even if he knew that the motor was hot, but that he nevertheless
should have informed the plaintiff that the motor was hot. However,
since the plaintiff had been warned by the police officer the Court
held that the omission of the operator was without causal con-
350. Note 264.
351. § 74 Air Traffic Ordinance in the wording of 1936 that provides such
rule, came into effect later.
352. Decision of Jan. 21, 1932-note 296.
353. July 3, 1934-9 U 328/32-1934 Archly fitr Luftrecht 274.
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nection to the accident, that happened when in spite of the warning
by the officer the plaintiff turned the propeller twice again.
G. Liability under laws apart from the Air Traffic Act.
§ 28 Air Traffic Act reads as follows: "Provisions of the laws
of the Reich under which the operator of an aircraft, the person who
uses it, (§ 19 IT), the pilot or another person, is liable to a greater
extent for damages resulting from the operation (Betrieb) of air-
craft, are not affected." The Reichsgericht, in the decision of July 4,
1938, 4 construed § 28, that, above all, it refers to the provisions
concerning unlawful acts. With regard to unlawful acts in the
sense of §§ 823 seq. German Civil Code, a problem arises from
§ 831 German Civil Code which provides that a person who employs
another for any kind of work is liable for damages unlawfully in-
flicted upon a third party by his employee in the course of his em-
ployment. As to whether a person is employed in the meaning of
§ 831 may cast some doubt in many cases. The owner of an airplane
had asked a pilot for training. He had yielded the airplane to the
pilot and the latter flew it for purposes of sport, transportation, ad-
vertisement, aviation exhibitions, etc., kept it in good repair and had
his name put on it. An accident occurred when the pilot used the
plane and the injured party brought a suit against the owner based
upon § 831 German Civil Code. The Oberlandesgericht Hamm8 55
held that said provision did not apply because the pilot was inde-
pendent as to the use of the plane and the owner had not employed
him for any work.
On the other hand, the Reichsgericht in a decision of March 11,
19393as a stated that a pilot was employed within the meaning of
§ 831 German Civil Code, if he had to fly an airplane owned by an
air-sport-association.. Consequently the association was liable under
§ 831 for all damages which the pilot inflicted to third persons in
the course of his employment, regardless of his own default. The
Reichsgericht pointed out that in the case at bar, under § 831, the
employer was liable unless he could show that he had used the nec-
essary care in selecting the pilot or that the damage would have re-
sulted notwithstanding his care or that the liability was excluded.
From the facts established by the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, as
court of appeal, the Reichsgericht found that the restriction of liabil-
ity covered only the liability provided by § 19 Air Traffic Act, but
not the liability for torts such as in question here. In reference to
the argument that the damage would have been inflicted even though
354. Note 61.
355. July 3, 1934-note 264.
355a. See note 346a.
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the pilot was selected carefully the Supreme Court held that the
mere fact tha't the pilot had acted negligently when the accident
happened refuted the assumption of his having been carefully se-
lected.
H. Apportionment of liability between several persons.
The Air Traffic Act provides an apportionment, if the damages
are caused by several airplanes or if another person is liable for
damages in addition to the operator. (§ 27) The question of the
meaning of § 27 Air Traffic Act in respect to damages caused by
flying over a fox farm was answered by the Reichsgericht. 356 The
Court held that under § 27 II Air Traffic Act any person, who is
liable for damages, is bound to an apportionment, and, if the damaged
person himself, as keeper of the foxes is liable under § 833 German
Civil Code,3 57 such liability had to be taken into account pursuant to
§ 27 Air Traffic Act. Hence, the Court stated that it was to be
examined, whether the destroying of the young foxes resulted from
an arbitrary and spontaneous attitude of the female foxes, which
was according to the nature of the animals as provided by § 833.
J. Liability in international carriage.
The Warsaw Convention was signed and ratified by Germany
and came into force there on December 29, 1933.358 In a case before
the Kammergericht 359 an international transportation was in ques-
tion. The lower Court had found that the carrier was not liable since
he had proved that it was impossible for him to take measures to
avoid the damage. 36 0 (Art. 20 Warsaw Convention). The Kammer-
gericht on appeal stated that the question of liability under the pro-
visions of the Warsaw Convention was immaterial, since the plain-
tiff was entitled only for damages that were based upon the law, and
the liability under the Warsaw Convention whs held to be founded
upon contract. 36 ' That the Warsaw Convention applied to trans-
portation from Berlin to K6nigsberg with a stop-over at Danzig as
an international one, the Court said in its reasoning that there was
no doubt of it. Consequently, a claim of the representatives of a
killed passenger rested upon the Warsaw Convention. The con-
tract of carriage was made in Germany between a German airline
and a German passenger for a flight from and to German airports
356. July 4, 1938-note 61.
357. § 833 paragraph I reads as follows: "If a person Is killed or the body
or health of a person is injured or a thing is damaged by an animal, the person
who keeps the animal is bound to compensate the injured party for any damage
arising therefrom." (Dr. Chung Hui Wang).
358. The states where the Warsaw Convention Is In force are compiled in
the (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 298. Furthermore, New Zeeland, Den-
mark without Greenland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Greece adhered.
359. See above notes 305, 340 especially as to the facts and problems.
360. A wing was cut loose from a fatigue fracture of the wing attachment.
361. See notes 305, 340. At the time of the mishap Danzig was a Free City.
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and the accident happened in Germany. The Kammergericht quoted
all those facts for its finding that German laws were to be applied.
It is understood that this was correct, and that there was no other
way.
The Reichsgericht 3ola upheld the decision. In reference to the
Warsaw Convention, the Court agreed with the Kammergericht that
the claim was based upon the transportation contract. Plaintiff
argued that the provisions which limited the liability were null and
void under Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention because they
tended to relieve the carrier of his liability. The Reichsgericht did
not enter into a discussion of this problem. It found that the Kam-
mergericht had stated that the provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion applied to the liability of the carrier. The Supreme Court added
that, assuming that the transportation contract eliminated the appli-
cation of the Warsaw Convention, Article 23 would not apply, since
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention were inserted in the
transportation contract.
The first German decision interpreting the liability provisions
of the Warsaw Convention was delivered by the Landgericht Frank-
furt a. M. on March 8, 1939.31b The facts were as follows: Plain-
tiffs' husband and father had made a round trip from Frankfurt a. M.
in Germany to Milan in Italy on an airplane of defendant's airline,
a Dutch company. On its way back the plane crashed in an emer-
gency landing, on July 20, 1935, with loss of passengers and crew.
The plaintiffs based a claim for damages upon the contention that
the accident was caused by gross negligence of the airline and the
members of the crew, particularly of the pilot.
The case was under the Court's jurisdiction, because Frankfurt
a. M. was the place of defendant's business, through which the
contract had been made and also the place of destination. (Article 28
Warsaw Convention.)
Plaintiffs rested the case upon Articles 17, 22, 25 of the Warsaw
Convention. The Court held that the claim for damages was well
founded only in so far as it was based upon Articles 17 and 22. It
declared that the facts did not show any negligence of the airline.
The Court discussed the technical condition of the crashed airplane
and followed the opinion of experts in agreeing that certain minor
defects which the plaintiffs held essential, did not interfere with a safe
flight. The Landgericht found from a thorough investigation of the
pilot's training and experience that he had satisfactory professional
skill and that the airline did not act negligently in appointing him
361a. See note 309a.
361b. 2/70. 169/37-1939 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 180.
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to fly the plane across the Alps. In discussing the activity of the
pilot8Olc the Court had to deal with several phases.
a. Plaintiffs argued that the pilot ought not to have started in
view of bad weather conditions, and, if he did, that he ought to have
climbed up to an altitude of at least 4,000 meters (13,350 feet) over
the Po River plains, before turning towards the'Alps. The Landge-
richt, which had heard several experts, did not agree and denied
any negligence of the pilot in this respect.
b. Further the Court had to examine whether the pilot, finding
bad weather conditions over the Alps, had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage. After a minute discussion of the evi-
dence and of the opinion of the experts the Court held that there
was no way to elucidate the question, the witnesses which might
have given particulars being dead. The Landgericht stated that
defendant had to furnish proof that the pilot had taken all neces-
sary measures and that this evidence had not been forthcoming.
The burden of proof lay upon them. In this connection the Court
denied that the pilot could not expect or foresee that he might
possibly find ice and thunderstorms when flying through a bank of
clouds at more than 13,000 feet.
c. Finally, the Landgericht examined the question whether or
not the pilot took the appropriate measures in trying an emergency
landing, during which the plane crashed from a height of nearly
135 feet. The Court said that the experts had developed three
theories as to the cause of the crash, none of which showed any
negligence of the pilot. The Court held that plaintiffs' further
claims-beyond Article 22-were unfounded, and continued: "It
follows from the Court's statements that neither defendant nor the
pilot can be charged with gross negligence. Gross negligence how-
ever is the statutory condition as prescribed by Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention, if the restriction of liability provided by
Article 22 ceases. Under Article 25 the carrier is not entitled to
avail himself of the provision of the Warsaw Convention which
limits the liability, if the damage is caused by him through malice or
by such default (grade of negligence) as, in accordance with the law
of the court to which the case is submitted, is equivalent to malice
(wilful misconduct)." The writers in their comments on the
Warsaw Convention agree that such a default implies only a really
high grade of negligence (see Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka, Luftver-
kehrsgesetz, I 3 to Article 25 Warsaw Convention). The wording
in the Warsaw Convention was chosen only, because the Anglo-Saxon
361c. As to the alleged negligence of other. crew members, the publishedjudgment does not show that the court entered into that subject.
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law does not know the term gross negligence as this term is recog-
nized in our (viz. German) jurisprudence. When the draft of the
Warsaw Convention was under consideration, there was unanimity
that gross negligence ought to be equal to wilful misconduct with-
in the meaning of Article 25, in those countries, the laws of which
recognize this type of negligence. The plaintiffs must show gross
negligence on the part of the defendant." The Court held that they
failed to furnish the necessary proof.
The problems which were discussed by the Landgericht Frank-
furt a. M. are of wide significance. It is not known at the present
time, whether the decision became final. The construction of Article
20 of the Warsaw Convention as given by the Court complies with
the general German theory, which sees in this rule the principle of
liability for fault with a transfer of the burden of proof and thinks
that this principle in its actual formulation is nearer to the German
liability for the result as provided by § 19 Air Traffic Act than to
the general liability for default. On the other hand, Professor
Goedhuis in his monographs on the Warsaw Conventions6 ld arrived
at different conclusions. He believes that the fundamental theory of
the Warsaw Convention is the principle of liability for default and he
thinks that this principle would be changed into a liability for result,
if the courts insisted on a strict proof that the operator and his
agents had taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage, or that
it was impossible to take such measures in a case such as at bar. Also
the IATA felt the liability provisions to be too burdensome to the
air carriers. It had the intention to ask the CITEJA for its opinion
on the subject,3 1ee and proposed an amendment under which the
air carrier is not liable to damages unless a presumption is created
by the facts that he or his agents acted negligently. De lege lata,
however, the decision of the Landgericht Frankfurt a. M. is correct.
Under the present political situation it is open to doubt whether or
not the contemplated. revision of the Warsaw Convention 361f will
come to pass and whether or not this revision will relieve the air
carriers' burden.
The provision of Article 25 shows the difficulties which arose
from the attempt to harmonize the principles of the Continental and
of the Anglo-Saxon law. As it was pointed out by the decision
of the Landgericht the term gross negligence is unknown to the latter
system. The wording of Article 25 tried to express the term by cir-
361d. La Convention de Warsovie, The Hague 1933, to Article 20; National
Air Legislation and the Warsaw Convention, The Hague 1937 p. 237.
361e. See Professor Riese in 1939 Archly fUr Luftrecht 127 note 12.
361f. (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 172.
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cumlocution. The German Ministry of Justice in an official release836 g
interpreted the meaning of Article 25 that a particularly high degree
of negligence was supposed to be equivalent to malice. The German
Act introducing the Warsaw Convention, however left it to the
decision of the German Courts, whether and to what extent they
would regard gross negligence as equivalent to malice. The Land-
gericht, in discussing the question, whether the pilot acted with gross
negligence, obviously regarded gross negligence as equivalent to
malice. Its opinion is not consistent with the opinion of German
writers.361 h They deduce from the fact that the liability for gross
negligence may be excluded by agreement (§ 276 II German Civil
Code) that the German law does not regard gross negligence like
malice. They believe that also the air carrier who has caused damage
by gross negligence is entitled to avail himself of the provisions
which exclude or limit his liability.
Professor Schleicher in his annotation of the decision puts an-
other question. 3611 Under the Dutch law regarding air transporta-
tion, gross negligence is equivalent to malice. Consequently, the
Dutch airline could not limit its liability for damages by excluding
liability for gross negligence in so far as the contract was made
in the Netherlands. (Article 24 Warsaw Convention). Hence, the
problem arises, whether the Dutch airline which could not exclude
its liability in the Netherlands might have done so in other countries.
The Landgericht did not discuss the problem. Professor Schleicher
answered in the affirmative, because Article 25 lex fori is decisive and
because the Dutch law applies only in so far as no other provision is
applicable under the Warsaw Convention.
K. Liability of other persons than operator and pilot.
The problem as to whether and under which circumstances the
entrepreneur of an aviation exhibit may be liable for an aircraft
crash happening during the exhibit, was exhaustively discussed in a
decision of the Landgericht Essen and on appeal by the Oberlandes-
gericht Hamm .3 62 The facts found by the Courts were the follow-
ing: On June 5, 1927, two aeronautic associations, both defendants,
had organized extensive exhibition flights at the airport M-iihlheim.
Plaintiff, a patron who had paid for admission, was injured in the
361g. Denkschrift des Reichsministers der Justz zum Warschauer Abkom-
men (Sonderverdffentlichung der Deutschen Justiz 1933 no. 1).
361h. Riese in Pfundtner-Neubert, Das neue Deutsche Reichsrecht VI f 2
note 5 to § 1 ; Schleicher-Reymann, Recht der Luftfahrt, note 1 to § rt. 25
Warsaw Convention.
3611. 1939 Archly fUr Luftrecht 189.
362. Landgericht Essen, Oct. 9, 1931-50.51/29 (15. 0. 104/30; 122/30;
5/20 0. 602/28 ; 604/28) 1933 Archiv fir Luftrecht 39-Oberlandesgericht
Hanem, Nov. 26, 1932-5 U 504/31-1933 Archly filr Luftrecht 248. [See also
the decision of the Penal Court (Erweitertes Sch6ffengericht Essen Dec. 12, 1922
-1928 Zeitschrift for das gesamte Luftrecht 54]. The case was annotated by
Tiemann and Victor Niemeyer 1933 Archly fir Luftrecht 44, 251.
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crash of an airplane during the exhibition. As to the exhibition, de-
fendants had engaged several pilots for acrobatic flights which were
mentioned by name in an official program book. The plane which
crashed was hired by a chocolate factory "Trumpf" for advertising
and grounded at the airport shortly after the exhibition had been
started. It was not named as participating in the program but an
advertisement of the "Trumpf" firm showing the plane, was there
published. The pilot was ordered by the Trumpf firm to perform
advertising flights, during the exhibition, over the grounds used
for the exhibition and to drop small bars of chocolate. After a first
flight finished without objection to the flying of the pilot, he took
off again carrying a certain W. whose task it was to throw off the
bars. Then the plane crashed into a crowd of spectators and the
plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff was dismissed from the Land-
gericht Essen Miihlheim, his appeal was disallowed. Since the de-
fendants were not operators of the plane, § 19 Air Traffic Act did not
apply, but only liability based upon contract or unlawful act.
Liability resulting from a contract made between the defendants
and the plaintiff in respect to the observation of the exhibit was
denied within the limits of such contract. The Landgericht character-
ized it as a contract for work in the sense of § 631 German Civil Code,
the Oberlandesgericht as a bilateral contract, but it did not give a
more detailed reasoning as to its characterization. 386 Both Courts
stated that the defendants had to provide for the security of the
public and that they were liable under the provisions of §§ 276, 278
German Civil Code for malice and negligence not only their own
but also of their agents and employees. Neither decision found any
default. The Court of Appeal dealt with the problem as to whether
the defendants should have interfered, if they had observed that
the pilot flew incorrectly in the first flight. The Court decided that
because the exhibition was under the supervision of the police, the
defendants, who had no contractual connection with the pilot and
the operator of the plane, would have had no other way than of
calling upon the police, who also were in charge specifically of super-
vising the flights. It was established in both decisions that the pilot
was not an agent or employee of the defendants, (Erfiillungsgehilfe).
The Landgericht pointed out that an agent or employee (Erf.iillungs-
gehilfe) is any person who is acting in the performance of a contract
with the intention of the debtor, also if such person is not bound
to act by an obligation to the debtor. Hence the acrobatic flyers, who
363. There was no need to decide the problem of characterization, since
there would always arise the same question of negligence or malice and liability
of a third person, whatever a type of contract it was.
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were engaged for the exhibition and mentioned by name in the -list
of participants were agents, or employees, but the Court expressed
considerable doubt as to the position of the "Trumpf" pilot. It stated
in its opinion that the "Trumpf" factory had been asked in a letter
to participate and that the firm had given a written promise to take
part provided it could get an airplane fitted for its purpose. In the
meantime, the Trumpf factory got a bargain for its advertisement
and two honorary tickets, but in the opinion of the Court it was not
to be inferred from those findings, that a contract was made. The
Court of Appeal also denied that a contract was made and said:
"Neither the pilot nor the airplane nor an advertised flight to be
flown by the Trumpf firm were quoted in the program booklet,
hence the defendants were not bound to present such flight to the
patrons who paid admission." In so far as a performance is not
announced, it may-as the Court stated,-also be presented in the
limits of the exhibition, but only if the manager intended to do so.
From a voluminous amount of evidence it concluded that no con-
tract was made. The Court found that the pilot of the crashed
plane asked the permission only of the police officer at the airport
to make the advertisement flight. The Court in its opinion proceeded:
"Since the defendants had no exclusive right to use the airport
which was available for public flights also during the exhibit, they
could not influence the Trumpf firm and its pilot and particularly not
by forbidding the flight or giving binding instructions. A contract,
by which they could be entitled to such instructions was not made,
even if the attendance of the Trumpf airplane was proposed by the
defendants." Since the defendants could not influence the pilot,
it must not be supposed that they intended to present the advertise-
ment flights to the spectators as a contractual performance in addi-
tion to the scheduled exhibition, all the less since the flight was
executed in the advertising interests of the Trumpf firm which had
ordered the flight and the dropping of chocolate." The Court added
that the pilot did not participate in the exhibition itself which was
planned to show the position and possibilities of aviation, and that
the dropping of chocolate, that was permitted only outside the
airport and outside the places for spectators did not affect the
patrons who paid admission. The consequence of the finding is
that the pilot was not an agent or employee (Erfiillungsgehilfe) nor
was he employed in the sense of § 831 German Civil Code. The
Court of Appeal in its opinion gave a further reasoning by deny-
ing that the pilot acted negligently. As to the denial of negligence
the Court's reasoning was as follows: The defendants had made
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a contract with the plaintiffs to show them the exhibition. For the
performance of this contract defendants were responsible for wilful
default and negligence. (§ 276 I 1 German Civil Code.) Under
§ 278 German Civil Code the defendants were responsible for negli-
gence and malice of persons whom they employed in fulfilling their
obligation to the same extent as for their own fault. The suit would
have been substantiated if (1) a contract had been made, (2) the
flight (of the crashed airplane) had been made in order to perform
the contract, (3) the defendants or the pilot had acted with wilful
default or negligence.
It seems that the Court felt that the answer in the negative to
point 2 was not beyond all doubt and therefore question 3 was also
discussed. 86 4 The Oberlandesgericht said in denying fault in the
pilot's acting: "The plaintiff's contention that flights over a gathering
at a lower altitude than 200 m (about 650 feet) was prohibited on the
day in question, June 5, 1922, is not correct since such prohibition
was not in effect until § 29 of the Air Traffic Ordinance of July 19,
1930, came into force. The ordinance did not repeat an existing
regulation but brought a regulation into being. At the time in question
the pilot could go down to 30 m (about 100 feet) because there
was no objection to flying at such an altitude, as experts stated in
the penal case against the pilot. On the other hand, it must be stated
that a flight at an altitude of 5 m (about 16 feet) over a crowd of
people was not permitted at all. In the case at bar it might be possible
that the pilot was not conscious of the low altitude of his flight, by
an excusable error in estimating, as it was explained on appeal in
the reasoning of the judgment of the penal court against the pilot.
The testimony of the pilot, that in his estimation he was flying the
second flight at an altitude of about 30 meter, is, as stated by the
Penal Court, likely or at least not refutable. The ground on the
west side of the airport is precipitous. Looking to the right the
pilot might have estimated that he was flying at an altitude of 30 m.
when really he was at 5 m." The court stated furthermore: "The
plane pancaked over some uneven spots on the west side of the air-
port. Besides this it was pushed down by peculiar ground winds.
The error in estimating and the failure in perceiving the dangerous
situation of the wind are not to be imputed to the pilot as his fault
364. The Landgerlcht said that the question of the pilot's negligence was
not to.be discussed, since he did not act for defendants in the performance of
the contract defendant versus plaintiff.
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or negligence. ' '3 65
The Oberlandesgericht in its opinion finally explained, that the
pilot was not employed in the sense of § 831 German Civil Code as a
servant (Verrichtungsgehilfe) and that it was no fault if the de-
fendants omitted to interfere with the advertisement flights, because
the first flight was performed correctly and because the police had
the supervision of the exhibition and in so far as the defendants had
no particular obligation to take care for the security of the public
in respect to the performed flights.
In the case at bar a suit was also brought against the State
based upon the contention that the police officers acted negligently,
in permitting the dropping of chocolate from low altitudes during
said exhibition where people were crowded together and that the
police officers ought to have known that the dropping was only pos-
sible if the plane was flown at a low altitude and would be dangerous
over the crowd of spectators. Defendant argued furthermore, that
the police officer failed to interfere after the first flight was executed
at a dangerously low altitude and that he failed to examine the nec-
essary certificates as to registration, etc., before he permitted the
start. The Landgericht held that the police officer did not act negli-
gently in permitting the dropping of chocolate since neither general
regulations of the Reich or State nor special rules for the airport
in question had been issued at that time under which such flight was
prohibited, and that there was nothing from which it could be inferred
that the officer in his findings and decision acted negligently. The
Court continued that flying against regulations in the first flight was
not proved. As to the examination of the certificates the Court
found that the police examined it within the limits of the law.866
In agreeing with the Landgericht as to its reasoning in denying neg-
ligence, the Oberlandesgericht said in addition that the liability of
the State was not evident since plaintiff failed to prove that there
was no other way for compensation of the damages (§ 839 German
365. In the crash a 13-year old boy was killed by the propeller and 2
persons were injured. The Penal Court found the pilot guilty of manslaughter
and bodily injury (see note 396). On appeal he was dismissed by a judgment
of the Grosse Strafkammer Essen: Oct. 16, 1928 - 13 J. 577/27-(not pub-
lished.) Some suits for damages against the pilot led to judgments against him.
His applications for appeal in forma pauperis were refused by the same Court
of Appeal who decided now that the pilot did not act negligently.
366. The case was peculiar, since the liability insurance, the conclusion of
which was examined by the Ministry before rating the airplane, had expired,
because the operator had changed. Therefore, the insurance company did not
cover the damages. The Landgericht held the police officer had nothing to do
with the question of insurance and did not have to and did not examine the
policy. Otherwise the start would have been forbidden. The question as to
whether the Ministry acted negligently because it did not revoke the certificate
of admission after the operator had changed and failed to ask for the insurance,
was not discussed at bar. But this case induced the authority to bring into
being the provision of § 106 Air Traffic Ordinance (1930) (1 107 12, wording
of 1936), providing that liability insurance has to be contracted under the
proviso that the liability of a new operator in the case of change is also covered
for the insured period.
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Civil Code, Art. 131 German Constitution, § 1, Act regarding Liabil-
ity of the State).
L. Private insurance.
The operators of aircraft and the entrepreneurs of airports and
of aviation enterprises are required to guarantee their responsibility
for damages either by liability insurance or by lodging cash or
negotiable documents with the authority. The liability insurance has
to cover the liability to third persons; in other words, to persons
who are not carried by the aircraft and are not employed by or held
in other contractual relations to the operator.80 7 As to the organiza-
tion and form of private air insurance the Air Traffic Act and Ordi-
nance prescribes that the insurance policy must also cover a new
operator in case of change during the insured period. It was left
to the interested parties to find and develop a form of contract suit-
able to the economic purposes. In connection with a liability insurance
that covers also liability against passengers, the German Airlines
(Deutsche Lufthansa and Deutsche Zeppelin Reederei) take out a
passenger's accident insurance. A passenger who is injured in an
accident may refer to the accident insurance, provided he waives any
claim for damages against the airline, but no payment from the
insurance will be made if the person entitled to damages sues the
air line for damages. Since the Warsaw Convention provides that
any provision tending to relieve, the carrier of liability or to fix
a lower limit than that which is laid down in the Convention is null
and void, the German Air lines cut out the reference which was
formerly made in the ticket to the accident insurance, and leave it to
the passenger in case of an accident to make his choice. In the
case that was decided by the Kammergericht on July 28, 1939,368 the
airline had proceeded in this way. The Court discussed the admis-
sibility of restriction of liability but did not touch upon insurance
problems. Since the beginning of summer 1939 all German airlines
have had to take out this combined insurance for internal transporta-
tion pursuant to an ordinance of the German Ministry of Aviation. 86 9
It is remarkable that insurance cases were brought to courts only in
an amazingly small number. The reasons for this fact are found by
Professor Oppikofer8 70 primarily in a close co-operation between
867. § 29 Air Traffic Act. §§ 106-110 Air Traffic Ordinance. Said obligationdoes not apply to the Reich as operator or entrepreneur. The Air Traffic Ordi-
nance 1930 provided in § 106 a general liability insurance covering any liability
of the operator, that meant also liability against persons who are carried by
the Plane and in other contractual relations as employees.
368. Note 305.
369. See Dr. Hermann D1ring, Die Entwicklung der Luftversicherung InDeutschland 39 Zeitschrlft fir die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft no. 1,
p. 53.
. 870. Oppikofer, Zure Entwicklung des privaten Luftversicherungsrechts inVerdiffentllchungen des Instituts ftir Versicherungswlssenschaft no. 1, p. 56.
GERMAN AIR LAW-A CASE HISTORY
insurance companies and insurance takers, from which resulted care-
fully drafted and fairly performed insurance contracts giving the
insurance protection exactly as needed for all kinds of insurance
as for accident, for liability and for injuries to the body.
The interpretation of an accident insurance policy was disputed
in a case decided by the Reichsgericht July 5, 1929.371 The Court
held that, if the accident insurance of a pilot by profession excludes
acrobatic flights, the whole flight, that was started with the pur-
pose of performing acrobatic exercises, is an acrobatic flight and not
only the single exercise. In reference to a presentation flight (Vor-
f-iihrungsflug) the Landgericht Berlin in a decision of July 9,
1929872 said, that the meaning of such word was to be interpreted in
the sense which the insurance taker must give it, whenever there
was a dispute over the interpretation. The term "contrivance for
flight' (Flugapparat) was interpreted by the Oberlandesgericht
Hamm 87 3 as referring to all appliances by which men are able to
entrust themselves to the air and therefore including parachutes.
CHAPTER IV. PENALTIES
A. General Provisions.
Under the German Penal Code §§ 315, 316 as amended by the
Act of June 28, 1925, a person who interferes intentionally with air
navigation resulting in a "common peril" is subject to penal servitude
or capital punishment. If the transgressor acts negligently he is sub-
ject to imprisonment or fine or both. The use of aircraft against
the intention of the entitled person is punishable pursuant to the
Ordinance of Oct. 20, 1932, against unlawful use of motor con-
veyances and bicycles. It seems that cases of general interest are not
reported.
B. Penalties in the Air Traffic Act.
In addition, the Air Traffic Act contains numerous provisions
for general penalties, 374 in respect to contraventions against regula-
tions of the Air Traffic Act, the Air Traffic-Ordinance and adminis-
trative ordinances and decrees.
1. § 31 no. 1 Air Traffic Act subjects a person who violates
an ordinance issued for public order and security under any provi-
sion of the Air Traffic Act in respect to air traffic and operating of
aircraft to a fine or detention, if the violator is not liable to greater
punishment under other penal laws.
371. VII 44/29-1929 Warneyer Rechtssprechung 301.
372. 1929 JUristische Rundschau ftir Privatversicherung 355.
373. Nov. 15, 1928-1929 Juristische Rundschau fUr Privatversicherung 153.
.374, §§ 31, 32, 33 Air Traffic Act and Act of Sept. 22, 1938 (1938 R.G.B1. I
1246).
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a. The Strafkammer of the Landegricht Plauen3 75 had to
decide the question as to what kind of ordinances are covered by
§ 31. The Ministry for Traffic had issued a decree on Nov. 23, 1926.
The decree was communicated only to certain persons and officials
especially to the police officers in charge of supervision of flight. It
contained the following :376 "I have communicated to all owners of
aircraft, to all aircraft undertakings and to all flying schools the fol-
lowing disquitions:... A warning must be issued.... It must be con-
sidered as punishable lack of care (strafbarer Leichtsinn) . . .It is
expected from each pilot . . . A pilot makes subject to an action for
damages and runs the risk of being punished criminally under the
provisions of the strafgesetzbuch. In order to cut down the number
of mishaps I request all owners of aircraft."
The Landgericht disapproved of the ruling of the trial judge
that the decree fell in the provision of § 31 of the Act and said: "A
decree within the meaning of § 31 is either a law in the formal sense
of the word or a regulation. A mere administrative order which
deals only with the relation between various officials and not with
their relation toward third persons does not come therein." From
the lack of proclamation, its very words and contents the Court
deduced that the decree did not refer to § 31 Air Traffic Act.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the provisions of the
Air Traffic Ordinance come within § 31 of the Act. Here arose the
problem as to whether the application of § 31 might be excluded by
other penal laws. § 100 Air Traffic Ordinance of 1930 (§ 102 in
the wording of 1936) provides that foreign aircraft are forbidden
to enter German territory unless such flight is generally permitted by
an international convention or by a special permission of the Author-
ity. Several cases of unlawful entering on the air into the German
airspace are reported .
77
a. The Sch6ffengericht Oppeln378 had to decide the following
facts. On Jan. 9, 1931, three Polish military airplanes flew over
German territory and two of them landed near Oppeln. W. a first
sergeant of the first Polish aerial regiment piloted the guiding plane;
J. a sergeant of the same regiment piloted the second plane with
orders to follow W. Both were accused of violating different laws
375. June 9, 1927-see note 184.
376 Quoted from Prof. Zollmann's translation (1931) 2 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 427.
377. The French pilot Coster was punished in 1925 because he had flown
over Germany without permit. (see 1925 (9) Revue Juridique Internationale
425 ; VI Air Service Information Nr. 566 of July 15, 1926).-See also: L'affaire
Franco-Roumaine de Navigation AMrenne.
378. Jan. 31, 1931-5 JM 7/31-1931 Archly ftlr Luftrecht 72 translated
by Professor Zollmann (1931) 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 594.
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by this same action, that of, a) crossing the German boundary with-
out permission, particularly without any paper stating their identity,
b) having failed to prove their identity by passport or other admitted
identification paper, c) contravening to § 31 No. 1 Air Traffic Act:
by entering into the German air space without permission and with-
out a general permit by an international convention. Both defendants
stated that they entered Germany unintentionally and the Court
did not find any reason to suppose that they acted wilfully. The Court
condemned W. stating that W. was guilty in the sense of c. The
Court in its opinion explained that it was the necessary consequence
of passing the boundary without proof of identity that W. could
not prove his identity by passport or by other papers and, therefore,
that he was not to be punished on the contravention b. As to the
violation of the Air Traffic Act the Court held that this provision
as an auxiliary did not apply since defendant's acting also violated
§ 1 of the passport ordinance of April 6, 1923. Defendant W. had
changed his statements in regard to the flight repeatedly particularly
as to the reasons for the loss of his bearings. The Court found that
defendant could not trust the compass alone and that he was well
aware of this and that he acted negligently because he failed to make
an emergency landing in Poland in time to get the necessary infor-
mation.3 79 Defendant J. was acquitted. The Court established that
J. did not act negligently in crossing the German boundary since
he was under military command to follow W.'s plane, and since
he had no sound reasons for believing that W. had lost orientation.
As to the relation of § 31 No. 1 Air Traffic Act the Court fol-
lowed a well established practice of the Reichsgericht in reference
to the application of an auxiliary penal law,3 8 0 stating that the auxi-
liary rule does not come into question if another penal law is
violated. There is no doubt that § 31 Air Traffic Act is an auxiliary
penal law, since it provides punishment only for such cases where
no other laws inflicting higher punishment are violated.
bb. On the other hand the Amtsgericht Schweinfurt in a deci-
sion of May 20, 1931381 held French military flyers guilty of having
violated by one and the same act the passport regulations and the
provisions of § 31 Air Traffic Act. Said flyers had flown military
planes carrying machine guns over the German boundary on May
379. The punishment was 2 weeks imprisonment making allowance for the
time that defendant had served by detention before trial. Professor Zollmann,
Cases on Air Law 2d ed. p. 56 said that the judgment was more a political
one. It is beyond the limits of this article to examine the different elements of
the Judgment, but to me the general findings as to negligence and as to the
relation of the different provisions seem to be in no way influenced by political
considerations.
380. 38 R.G.St. 383; 44 R.G.St. 1; 58 R.G.St. 240.
381. B 563/31-1931 Archly ftir Luftrecht 267.
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16, 1931. They were not provided with passports or other identifi-
cation cards and were not authorized either by a general convention
or by special permit to enter Germany by plane. The Court did not
explain for what reasons it deviated from the general opinion
of the Reichsgericht. It may be that the Court had overlooked the
nature of § 31 Air Traffic Act as an auxiliary penal law.
As to the fact that the planes were not registered in Germany
and defendants had no pilot certificates, the Court found that § 31
I 1, 3 II Air Traffic Act did not apply because they refer only to intra
German air traffic. In respect to § 14 Air Traffic Act, that forbids
carrying of arms in an airplane unless with special permission, the
Court stated that § 31 No. 1 Air Traffic Act was not in question,
because § 14 also refers only to intra-German air traffic. As to the
importation of arms, which is forbidden and subject to punishment
under the Act regarding War Material, the Court held the de-
fendants not guilty, because they did not bring the arms to Germany
with the intention of leaving then there.
cc. In a third case before the Sch6ffengericht Braunsberg38
2
the Court held that the unlawful entry by air without identification
documents of a Polish military pilot was to be subjected to penalty
only under the passport regulations. Since the defendant had landed
after his entry and finding himself in Germany took off again with
the intention of reaching Polish territory, the Court held him guilty
of a second violation of the law38 3 and subjected him to a punishment
pursuant to § 31 No. 1 Air Traffic Act.
2. The pilot of a German aircraft, who, in a foreign country,
violates an international convention or treaty agreed upon by the
Reich is subject to criminal penalty under § 31 No. 2.884 Such a
case has been brought before the Amtsgericht Altdamm. a8 5 A
German airplane, enroute from Norderney to Friedrichshafen, flew
over Swiss territory on July 2, 1936. Near Basel in Switzerland he
flew at an altitude less than 1650 feet (500 in). The Swiss regula-
tions of Aug. 3, 1923386 forbid such low flying except in case of
emergency and the Air Traffic Convention between Germany and
382. May 19, 1931-1 F. 54/31-1931 Archly fflr Luftrecht 134.
383. § 104 Air Traffic Ordinance liP30 (§ 105 Air Traffic Ordinance in the
wording of 1936 has the same purport): Foreign aircraft that had entered
Germany unlawfully must land and is forbidden to continue the flight without
special permission.
384. Since the amendment of Dec. 19, 1935 (1935 R.G.BI. I 1516). Formerly
such violations were not to be punished since the German Penal Code in § 6
provides that contraventions (i.e. an act subject to detention or fine up to
150.-R.M.=$60) committed in foreign countries are subject to criminal penal-
ties only under special laws or conventions. Generally violations of foreign
regulations refer to such light contraventions.
385. Jan. 8, 1937-2 C, 99/36-1937 Archiv ftir Luftrecht 204.
386. 1923 Bundes Blatt II 722.
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Switzerland provides that private flyers of both countries in so far
as they are allowed to fly over the other country's territory are' sub-
jected to its regulations. 38 7 Defendant argued that he was in an
emergency because of bad weather conditions. The experts concluded
that defendant was unable to turn back or aside before crossing
the Swiss border, that he had to keep below the clouds as he could
not fly blind, and that the attainment of a height necessary to pass
over the mountains without danger to plane or passengers required
a flight, after the skies cleared, of about ten miles. The Court fol-
lowed the experts and held that defendant was in an emergency near
Basel and the flight as performed at a lower altitude than 1650 feet
was justified. Defendant was acquitted.
3. Until the Act regarding the Reorganization of the Reich s88
was passed in 1934, the Reich and the States were competent to
issue rules and regulations for air traffic. How competency was
distributed between them is of mere historical interest, since said act
abolished the independent existence of the German States.8s 9 In a
decision of Nov. 24, 1931890 the Kammergericht had to deal with
the problem of whether an ordinance issued on Oct. 26, 1928,
by the Police President of Dortmund relating to management and
traffic of the Airport Dortmund was within the jurisdiction of this
officer. The Court had to deal with two questions: Was the ordi-
nance lawful from a general viewpoint, and did the Air Traffic Ordi-
nance as it came into being 1930 affect the police ordinance? The
Court developed the following principles: Besides § 31 Air Traffic
Act of 1922 there was no room for criminal regulations of the States
as far as they subjected the same act to criminal penalty. The
opinion of some German writers8 9 1 that, in the aviation field, the
legislative power of the States to issue supplementary regulations
was abolished by § 17 I 3 Air Traffic Act 39 2 is not to be agreed
with. The legislative power of the Reich over "the traffic with power
conveyance in the air" as stated by Art. 7 No. 19 German Constitu-
tion is enlarged by the Air Traffic Act § 1. Since the Act was voted
by a qualified majority the enlargement is not against the constitu-
387. Convention of Sept. 14, 1920-1921 Zentralblatt ftir das Deutsche
Reich 168, 171.-Art. 14. Similar provisions in all other German Conventions
relative to air navigation; see also Cina Convention Art. 25.
388. Gesetz iber den Neuaufbau des Reiches of Jan. 30, 1934-1934 RGB1.
I 75.
389. The Act of Dec. 15, 1933-1933 RGBI. I 1027-provided that the air
police was to be transferred to the Reich. It was obsolete a few weeks later by
the Reorganization Act (note before).
390. 1 S. 408/31-1932 Archly fUr Luftrecht 88.
391. See Basarke in 1927/28 Zeitschrift fUr das gesamte Luftrecht 65, 72,
94, 130, 135.
392. Refers to the wording of 1922. Amended Dec. 15, 1933-1933 RGBI. I
1022.
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tion. § 17 I 3 Air Traffic Act in the wording before 1933 did not pro-
vide an exhaustive regulation. The States had legislative power to
regulate aviation pursuant to Art. 7, 12, 13, 14 German Constitution
§§ 1, 17 Air Traffic Act, until and in so far as the Reich did not
issue regulations within the limits of its legislative power. From a
review of the different regulations existing on Oct. 26, 1928, the
Court found that at that time an ordinance concerning the air traffic
in the airport of Dortmund was admissible. As to the relation to the
Air Traffic Ordinance the Court stated that the ordinance was an-
nulled in so far as the Air Traffic Ordinance contained the same or
inconsistent regulations, but that the regulations of the police ordi-
nance remained in force, in so far as they were neither inconsistent
with the provisions of nor with a subject ruled by the Air Traffic
Ordinance.
Under the new organization of the Reich the police are placed
under the Reich. Hence there will arise only the problem of whether
a police ordinance was within the limits of the general laws and
particularly of the acts and ordinances relating to aviation.
4. The Air Traffic Act, in § 32 No. 5, subjects to criminal
punishment any person who without permission or contravening the
conditions prescribed by the Authority, trains airmen, who constructs
or operates airports or undertakes aviation enterprises or affairs. The
cases reported are discussed supra, since the problem are of less
interest in their penal aspects than as to general questions and defi-
nitions.
The cases deal with the interpretation of § 6 Air Traffic Act
as to the meaning of the training of students for airmen, and with
§ 11 C.c. as to the definition of aviation enterprises and affairs and
airlines.89 8
C. Penalties in General Penal law.
The violation of general penal laws was the problem of the fol-
lowing decisions, both dealing with harm done to third persons by
accident.
1. On June 3, 1932, defendant took off in an airplane that
he had constructed himself and that was rated for experimental
and test flights. The plane crashed upon the roof of a factory in the
neighborhood of the airport and two workers were injured and one
killed by the parts of the plane coming through the roof. Defendant
was acquitted of the charge of manslaughter and bodily injury.3 94
. 393. Landgericht Plauen June 9 1927, notes 184, 376; Kammergericht
June 30, 1930, notes 196, 199 sq.; Schbffengericht Llegnitz April 28, 1926, and
Strafkammer Llegnitz November 10, 1927 notes 220, 221; Bayrlsches Obersteo
Landesgericht May 23, 1932, notes 188, 192.
394. Landgerlcht II Berlin August 27, 1932-4 JM 43/32-1933 Archiv
far Luftrecht 108.
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He stated in trial that he wanted to make a precision landing with
standing propeller and stalled the airplane in order to stop the
propeller quickly; that he was nearly upside-down when the plane
did a left spin; and that he failed to regain control of the plane by
opening the engine full out. It may be of some interest that the
expert witnesses at the airport had the impression defendant was
looping the loop,395 but they admitted that defendant might have
flown upside-down unintentionally. The Court stated that there was
some difficulty in differentiating from the ground whether the
maneuvers of a flyer were intentional or not and held defendant's
statement credible. The law requires in §§ 222 I, II, 230 I, II, 231
German Criminal Code that the act has been done negligently. The
Court did not find that defendant was negligent.
2. A charge of manslaughter and bodily injury brought the
pilot of the Trumpf firm to trial for the above discussed crash. The
Sch6ffengericht Essen 396 found the pilot guilty of manslaughter
and of bodily injury by negligence. The Court held that the pilot
acted negligently in flying over a crowd of people at such a low
altitude as 15 feet "particularly since a companion was in the plane
and defendant had to figure that he might act in a 'maladroit' man-
ner." Besides this "the pilot should have figured and he did figure"-
as the Court explained-"that under the circumstances (low altitude,
slow speed, choked motor) he lacked the necessary control of the
craft to prevent danger to the public in case of any irregularity ocur-
ring in connection with it, such as a temporary failure of the motor
to function." As to the punishment the Court took into considera-
tion that the purpose of dropping chocolate bars was only to be
accomplished from a low altitude and over a crowd and that the de-
fendant was employed to do the job as he did, and finally that the
companion by his 'maladroit' manner cut down the low speed to a
still lower level. On appeal the Strafkammer in Essen3 97 acquitted
defendant. It held that defendant came down to a lower level than
he realized and that this failure to note the exact altitude of the
flight was due to circumstances beyond his responsibility.
395. Under § 81 Air Traffic Ordinance in the wording of 1930 looping was
only permitted with an airplane rated for acrobatic flights and outside of
inhabited places. It was forbidden over a gathering of people. § 72 of the
amended Air Traffic Ordinance in the wording of 1936 prohibits acrobatic
flights over airports, inhabited places, and a gathering of people, unless the
Alrboard has granted a special permit.
396. Dec. 19, 1922-13 J 577/27-I11 288/27-1928 Zeitschrift f(Ir gesamte
Luftrecht 54-translated by Professor Zollmann (1931) 2 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 431 as to the facts see note 362.
397. Oct. 16, 1928-13 J. 577/27-; the case Is not published. See note 365.
